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CHAPTER I
THE FOUNDATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP

Alliances between sovereign states have been among
the least stable of political associations.

The relationship

between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, two totalitarian
governments, was an uneasy one in the period 1933 to 1945.
The foreign policies of each, when directed towards expansion
and world power, found sympathy and support from each other in
challenging the international order established at Versailles
in 1919.

In Great Britain, Russia and the United States, they

shared the same opponents, but their antagonism toward these
enemies involved different objectives which made coordinated
foreign policies ultimately impossible.

Their interests were

often contradictory, and the two were caught up in grandiose
delusions about each other's political and military goals.

Both

practiced such secrecy and deception concerning their own
objectives that even on occasions when their interests
genuinely converged they were unable to work effectively together.
The accession of Adolf Hitler to power in Germsjiy
foreshadowed a new relationship between Germany and Japan.
Hitler, in his philosophical work, Mein Kampf, expressed the
idea of expansion or Lebensraum. Leoensraum demanded space to
the east at the expense of Russia and if necessary through the
use of force.

Thus Hitler looked to Japan as a potential ally

in a Russo-German conflict. His own analysis of the strategic
errors in World Y/ar I suggested that the international policy of

1

2
encirclement had been the cause of Germany's defeat.

In any

future war, Hitler meant to encircle Germany's opponents.
The new governments of the 1930's, through the press,
radio and the screen, had at their disposal channels of power
undreamed of and they faced the consequent necessity of making
their administrations understood in terms of popular appeal.
Mass inculcation brought in its train mass justification. The
second half of the nineteenth century had seen the appearance
of scientific explanations of biological superiority.

The

twentieth century raised it to an "ideal" and called it race.
Hitler and the Nazi Party, in their fight for power and
subsequent totalitarian regime, used the "ideal" of racial
superiority to justify their acts in foreign and domestic
policies.

The German people were told that they were oppressed

at home and humiliated abroad, yet they, as Germans, constituted
the embodiment of the superior Nordic racial type.

Afflicted

psychologically with the burden of defeat after the first World
War, the German citizen found comfort in the explanation that
his superiority had been unimpaired but that he had been
betrayed.

The argument had appeal, for it touched popular

sensitivity and the Nazis, above all Hitler, recognized this
weakness and manipulated it for their rise to power. Hitler
needed a united state, based on racial superiority, to serve
1
as the foundation for German territorial expansion.
Hitler believed that Japan, like Germany was the victim

I
Adolf Hitler, Kein Karnpf (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock,
1940), p8J?t I chapter XI passim.

3
of a Jewish international conspiracy.

The Jew hated Japan in

whose Asiatic state he could not adapt himself and so subjugate
it. Hitler stated:
He (the Jew) dreads a Japanese national State in his
millennial Jew empire, and therefore wishes its destruction
in the advance of the founding of his own dictatorship.
Therefore, he is now inciting the nations against Japan,
as against Germany, and it can happen that, while British
statescraft still tries to build an alliance with Japan,
the British Jewish press already demands struggle against
the ally and prepares the destructive war under the
proclamation of democracy and the battlecry: Down with
Japanese militarism and Imperialism, 2
Hitler never really liked the Japanese and regarded them with
distain and contempt. However, a fact which may have had some
influence in Hitler's future considerations was that Japan,
like Germany suffered from world Jewry,
The one-sided argument of racial superiority was a
domestic issue before the Nazis obtained control of the government,
but the introduction of such a concept into foreign policy
would ruin relations with most world powers.

In the realm of

foreign policy, most nations saw themselves obligated to conduct
their diplomacy after World War I in the name of some "ideal".
Natural boundaries turned into self-determination, the "white
man's burden" lost its appeal and arbitration and international
cooperation became the substance of international relations.
International isolation would result if the Nazis persisted in
the ideas of racial superiority,
ïïazi racial philosophy loomed large as a consideration
in German foreign policy after 1933, and relations with Japan

2
Ibid., peTt II, p. 931.

presented a special problem. How could a racially superior
Germany conclude an agreement on equal terms with a supposedly
inferior nation like Japan? Somehow racial philosophy and the
practical considerations of foreign policy would have to be
reconciled in order to undertake any diplomatic negotiations.
The Nazis modified their racial philosophy in order to
conciliate their administration with the dictates of foreign
policy.

The success of Japan in Manchuria in 1931 served to

qualify the strict doctrines of racial superiority in Mein Kampf.
The military spirit of the Japanese army impressed Hitler,
A restriction of international racial propaganda occurred after
1933 for the general purpose of avoiding unnecessary disputes
in foreign affairs and with the specific intention of
cultivating better relations with Japan,
Hitler was enough of a politican not to let ideology get
in the way of his diplomacy.

The racially superior Germany

allied with the inferior Japan for the sake of expediency.

An

alliance with Japan presented several opportunities for Germany's
international position.

Hitler admired the militant Japanese

state and could do only one thing:

he made the Japanese

"honorary Aryans" as Party officals gave the Japanese a patent
of racial enoblement to further diplomatic relations between
3
the two countries. Nazi racial philosophy would have to be
subjugated to the necessities of the German position in
world affairs.
3
Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (Oxford; Oxford
University Press, 1937), 1936, p. 385. [Hereinafter cited as
Toynbee, SIA).

5
The Nazi-controlled press attempted to mitigate the
dichotomy in racial thought and to promote closer relations
between Germany and Japan by reducing racial tension. The Party
writers proclaimed that the essence of Nazi racial doctrine was
strictly an internal domestic affair and did not contain a value
judgement about other racial groups. The Party recognized that
there existed peoples whose differences did not necessarily
make them racially inferior and that the Japanese possessed
racial qualities which made them suitable allies for the racially
arrogant Germans.

Diplomacy expediency resolved the differences

between Germany and Japan.

Nazi hypocrisy arranged that the

racial question would give no cause for offense to the ally,
Japan, for Nazi ideals proved no obstacle to Nazi practice.
The Nazis had one other influential factor whose support
was considerable for an alliance with Japan:

Geopolitics,

Racial superiority had to be recast to suit the exigencies of
the Japanese relationship, but Geopolitics on the other hand,
advocated a pro-Japanese stance. The pseudo-science of Geopolitic
was a subject which made geography a determining constituent
of history.

As it was used by the Nazis it was nothing more

than the ideology of imperialist expansion.
Geopolitics had its orgins in Germany,

The country had

been a leader in geographical research in the nineteenth century
and Geopolitics evolved from this background in the ea-rly
part of the twentieth century.

The main tenets of Geopolitics,

the dynamics of a growing state organism and planned imperialism,
became the political doctrines of Karl Haushofer, a former

6
general and later professor of geography at the University of
4
Munich, ^Haushofer, while in the German army, went on a tour of
duty to Japan in 1909. He witnessed the annexation of Korea
in 1910 and the diplomatic preparations surrounding the event.
When he returned to Germany in 1911 he wrote extensively on the
community of interests between Japan, Russia and Germany.

He

did not receive much encouragement in Germany, the country
that had coined the phrase, "the Yellow Peril".
Haushofer's fundamental calculation was the geographical
pivot of history with a combination of Germany, Japan and Russia
to outwit the Western Powers, Great Britain and France.

This

combination would destroy the sea power of the duo through its
internal lines of communication,

Japan was to play a leading

role in the self-determination of the Asiatic peoples of the
Far East and this would entail a shift in the balance of power
in the Pacific.

Germany, with her interests in China, could
5
hold the balance by allying herself with Japan.
Haushofer expounded these postulates of his Geopolitics
in the interwar period to such attentive students as Rudolf
6
Hess, the future deputy Party leader of Nazi Germany. Haushofer
visited Hitler while he was in prison with the help of Hess
but little is known about his influence on Hitler. However,
4
Karl Haushofer, 1869-1946. German geographer, theorist of Nazi
Geopolitics. He later served as an advisor to Hitler and then
committed suicide in 1946,
5
Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer (New York:
Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940), cHapters I-IV passim.

6
Rudolf Eess, 1894-, Nazi follower of Hitler. He flew to
Scotland in 1941, sentenced at Nuremberg in 1946 and is still
in prison.

7
Hitler's political view of world affairs did contain some of
the ideas of Geopolitics.
With careful propaganda and ideas of Geopolitics, the
Nazis made the race issue compatible for a future entente with
Japan. Germany needed a friend among the major world powers to
escape from her encirclement in Europe and Japan was the only
country which appeared worthy for an alliance of mutual
"have-not" nations.

The ideas of Geopolitics and Germany's

position made it expedient to forego the Hitlerian ideals of a
superior race in favor of a practical diplomatic policy to save
the Third Reich from political isolation.
Germany had been in the Par East, principally in China,
since the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The Bismarckian

era in Germany had prompted imperialistic expansion into China

for commercial exploitation which in turn had served notice to
a new Japanese government of a powerful rival in the Par East,

The Keiji Restoration reinstituted à strong, central
government in Japan that looked to the West for its technology.
The new Japan chose Germany to supply much of its technical
growth and German military officers to construct a modern
Japanese army along western lines.

It was this German-trained

army and German-oriented leadership that shocked the Western
world with its defeat of the Russian armies in the Russo-Japanese
War in 1904-1905.

This close technical and economic cooperation

continued until the outbreak of the first World War.

Germany

and Japan found themselves on opposite sides in the war and
Japan took advantage of conditions in Europe to occupy German

8
possessions in China and in the Pacific,
At Versailles, Japan felt slighted by her allies because
she had to return many of her captured territorial conquests,
Japan then adopted a policy of peaceful co-existence with her
neighbors in the Pacific, but the economic crisis of the world
depression intensified the frustration of the peace settlements
and encouraged political radicalism.

A militant young officer

corps of the Japanese army developed a boundless nationalism
constructed on a philosophy of territorial expansion through the
use of military force. The nationalists in Japan immediately
recognized that the depression reduced foreign markets and
imported raw materials, threatening the very foundation of the
Japanese state. The Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931
v/as an expression of the omnipresent pressure of the military
complex and the depression.

The conquest of Manchuria signalled

the beginning of the military domination and eventual control
of the government in Japan,
The incident in Manchuria meant a new foreign policy
for Japan because the act isolated Japan from the world
community.

The other world powers looked upon the act as

contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations and against
previous declarations outlawing such actions.

Japan withdrew

from the league of Nations in March, 1933 to protest the
non-recognition of the newly created puppet state of lûanchukuo.
The United States and Great Britain assumed a new interest in
the Pacific in light of the hostile actions of Japan against
China. Japan, threatened by the naval powers in the Pacific and

9
the colossus Russia in the north, cast around for a friendly
power in -a similar situation. The Nazi state in Germany appeared
to have a bond with Japan through common grievances and
common isolation,
Germany had had strictly formal relations with Japan
through the 1920's but with Hitler in power in 1933, the situation
changed rapidly,

Germany had withdrawn from the League of

Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933 and had signed
a non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934.

These diplomatic

events had aroused the British and the French and a hostile
Russia.

This opposition and the change in Nazi racial propaganda

had helped to construct a new friendship with Japan.

The

international status of both countries after events in 1933 had
made both totalitarian states anti-League, anti-communist and
anti-revolutionary, but in an active aggressive way favoring
territorial expansion.
Germany renewed her diplomatic contacts with Japan
because increased tension in Europe necessitated a strong
diplomatic maneuver by Hitler against one of his potential
enemies, Russia, Hitler wanted to encircle Russia and an entente
with Japan v/as one step towards this goal.

Hitler's fear of

Russia and his tirades against Bolshevism were to provide the
impetus to diplomatic negotiations that was to begin the
tenuous alliance between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,

CHAPTER II
THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT 1933-1936

Germany's position in 1935 stimulated the need for an
ally to share the burden of world hostility.

Great Britain and

Prance did not approve of Germany's decision to rearm and open
rumors circulated in European capitals of possible punitive
actions and a preventive v/ar against the Nazi regime.

Hitler

signed a ten year non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934 with
a stipulation to respect existing territorial rights. The
ag3?eeïnent created a serious breach in the French eastern
European alliance system but France countered with a treaty of
mutual assistance with Russia in 1935.

Germany's new militant

position aroused Soviet fears and suspicions. Russia in turn
signed a treaty for mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia in
the same year.

The imminent threat of encirclement alarmed

Hitler and prompted serious consideration of an alliance with
Japan.

The fear of Bolshevism and the new Soviet menace in

western Europe was the immediate basis for the decision.
Most Prussian statesmen of the nineteenth century acted
on the assumption that Russian neutrality was the key to
Germany's security.
motives.

Hitler's change of attitude had several

The leader of Germany, who had risen to power on the

claim that he had crushed Communism at home, had to be consistent
in his policy toward Russia. But after his domestic victory,
it was necessary to convince the German public that a larger
Communist menace still cast its shadow upon Germany from the

10

11
vast spaces beyond her eastern frontiers. The Fuehrer's
emotional attitude, an attitude in which fear was compounded
with hatred, and hatred with hysteria, served to champion
National Socialism as the saviour of the western world, commending
itself to the critics of the regime.

The hatred of Russia

helped to perpetuate the ideas in Mein Kampf of Lebensraum
in the east and the need for territorial expansion to meet the
needs of the German people. The Bolshevik threat could be
construed to make German rearmament acceptable in western Europe
with the Hitlerian assurance that the new German national
policy would be used to defend Europe against the Russian "Red
Peril".

The clash of the rival political systems was an

important feature of international relations in Europe and the
antagonism of Communism an equally important factor in the
foreign policy of Japan in the Far East.
The Japanese government, in the midst of a virulent
nationalism and influenced by the military, considered Russia
an anathema to its mission in the Far East.

Japan saw herself

as the divinely appointed promulgator of a particular type of
political and cultural ideals.

These ideals clashed with the

formitable Communist doctrines of Russia.

In Japan's attempt

to bring under her influence various Chinese and Mongolian
peoples, Russia imposed restrictions upon Japanese expansionist
aims in the Far East that were intolerable to the Japanese
militarists and nationalists.
Japan successfully had suppressed Communism as a
domestic threat, but the military leaders had come to regard

12
the spread of Communisra on the east Asiatic mainland as Japan's
principal external danger; and this danger was the motive
underlying a large part of the Japanese action in Manchuria
and in North China,
Hitler dealt cautiously with the proposed Japanese
entente.

There were many groups in the country who were not

favorably disposed toward Hitler's pro-Japanese policies, among
them the German army. The Reichswehr (German army) had been
providing China with military advisors since 1928 and the military
prestige, coupled with a profitable outlet for Germany's armament
industries made the Reichswehr Sinophile in its Par Eastern
disposition. It was a favorite subject for German military
authors to point to Japan's economic weaknesses in the conduct
of modern war because her war potential was entirely dependent

on raw materials from abroad.

This pro-Chinese position also

manifested itself in the Wilhelmstrasse (the German Foreign Office)
The German Foreign Office displayed little support for
Hitler and regarded him as an upstart in matters of foreign
policy, traditionally handled by the career diplomats of
Germany's foreign service. Hitler's first Foreign Minister,

1
Freiherr von îTeurath, was indubitably a man of the old school
and a career diplomat. Hitler's judgement of him was good;
"Ueurath is unimaginative.

Shrewd as a peasant, but with no ideas.

1
Constantine von Neurath, 1873-1956, German statesman. After a
long diplomatic career, he was Hitler's Foreign Minister, 19331938 and later protector of Bohemia, He was tried at Nuremberg,
sentenced to prison and released in 1954.
2
Herman Raushnig, The Voice of Destruction (New York: G.P,
Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 275.

13
As a product of the Y/llhelmstrasse, von Neurath was pro-Chinese.
When confronted with unpleasant realities, von Neurath preferred
to evade the issue rather than to offer his personal opposition.
This was what Hitler wanted as he stated: "...At the moment
it's his benevolent appearance that is of most use to me.

You

can't imagine a man like that going in for a revolutionary policy
3
they will say in England," Hitler realized that the career
diplomats furnished a measure of respectability for the Nazi
regime in international relations. But it was too early to
replace these diplomats with Hitler's own men to commence his
personal diplomatic schemes.

Hitler faced a real problem in

finding an adequate substitute for the German Foreign Office
inasmuch as the Party's o\m members lacked diplomatic training.
Most Party members had not been abroad and lacked any facility
in foreign languages. To fill this gap in his entourage, Hitler
4
turned to a trusted friend, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
Ribbentrop had served in the German army during the
first World War and then as a member of the German delegation to
Versailles. He had formed his own wine company after the war,
married the daughter of another wine merchant, and quickly
had become one of the leading dealers in Europe.

With his

champagne conviviality, charm and linquistic facilities,
Ribbentrop had become a welcome figure in the salons of the
3
Ibid., p. 275.
4
Joachim von Ribbentrop, 1833-1946. Nazi Foreign Minister. He
served as ambassador to Great Britain, 1936-1938 before becoming
Foreign Minister from 1938 to 1945. He was tried at Nuremberg,
and hanged in 1946.

major European embassies.

Prom these glimpses of diplomatic

life, he-had acquired a taste for the responsibilities and the
power of world diplomacy.
Ribbentrop met Hitler in August, 1952, when Ribbentrop,
favorably disposed to the Nazi movement, received Hitler at his
home in Dahlem as a frequent guest.

The Party's leadership,

Goering, Hess, Goebbels and Rosenberg, considered Ribbentrop
to be an interloper.

For a while, Ribbentrop served as an

instructor to the Party on foreign affairs and as an advisor to
Hitler, who made use of his linguistic abilities.

In April, 1934,

Hitler appointed Ribbentrop Reich delegate on matters of
.disarmament, Ribbentrop used his position to see the daily
dispatches from abroad and reports sent to Hitler,

He

synthesized Hitler's opinions on various matters and made them
his own.

The similarity between Ribbentrop's views and his

own, impressed Hitler, who welcomed this contrast to the
conservative advice of the Wilhelmstrasse,
Hitler, astute enough to realize that he could not allow
a novice to take over the execution of foreign affairs, instead
allowed Ribbentrop to form his own organization for foreign
affairs, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, in late 1934, This paraforeign service, financed from Hitler's private budget, served
several useful purposes.

The Dienststelle Ribbentrop handled

many confidential tasks and substituted for the distrusted
Foreign Office, which now conducted only routine matters in
foreign affairs, Ribbentrop assembled a collection of newspaper
people, linquists, professors and businessmen to staff his

15
organization.

He preformed his early missions with singular

dispatch and vigor, and his genial appearance, affability and
informality were in sharp contrast to the Wilhelmstrasse
diplomats, Ribbentrop's agents kept German embassies and
legations under constant surveillance and provided Hitler with
two agencies to manipulate his foreign policy.
As chance would have it, both Germany and Japan had
exchanged new military attaches in early 1934 which proved to
be of great significance in the diplomatic relations between the
5
two countries. Colonel Eugen Ott had served for about ten
years in the political department of the German Foreign Office.
He had served for a short period of time in 1933 as an offical
observer for the German army in Japan and then had returned to
Germany.

Ott received the appointment of military attache' to

Tokyo and had departed from Berlin with no specific instructions
for his new task from his superiors but with the knowledge of
Hitler's intense interest in the Par East.

6
The Japanese appointment of Colonel Hiroshi Oshima as
military attache to Germany had a more deliberate purpose,
Oshima had served as an assistant attache in Germany and Austria
from 1921 to 1923 and was outspokenly pro-German and a
representative of the Japanese army.

The Japanese military

attaches reported directly to General Headquarters in Tokyo
5
Eugen Ott, German army officer. He served as
to Japan until 1939 and then became ambassador
of the war.
6
Hiroshi Oshima, 1693-1948. Japanese officer.
Japanese ambassador to Germany in 1941. later
war crimes and hanged in 1943.

military attache
until the end
He was the
he was tried for

16
with the authority to enter into independent negotiations on
any military agreement, Oshima had received instructions to
investigate the stability of the Nazi regime, the future of the

7
German army and the state of relations "between Germany and Russia.
These military appointments, surrounded by events
which seemed most auspicious, furthered the German-Japanese
entente.

Both countries displayed an interest in the

possibilities of an alliance in 1935. Hitler regarded the
Japanese as an influential factor in the Russian situation and
considered a war between Russia and Japan over China as a
possible opportunity for German intervention in European Russia*
The early diplomatic exchanges between the two countries
8

were cautious.

The German ambassador, Herbert von Dirksen,

suggested to the Foreign Office in early 1934 that Germany
recognize the new state of Manchukuo in order to eniiance
Germany's relations with Japan and to lessen Japanese resentment
9
on the racial issue. The presence of German military' advisors
in China irritated the Japanese, who resented this assistance
10

to Chiang Kai-shek.

'

-

The German government hesitated and advised

7
International Military Tribunal fo the Far East (Tokyo: War
Ministry Library, 1943)7 P* 3508. (Hereinafter cited as IMT'FE).
8
Herbert von Dirksen, 1882-. German diplomat. He had a longcareer in the German Foreign Office and served as German
ambassador to Jaoan from 1936 to 1938.
9
Documents on German Foreign Policy (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 19597, Series C vol. II, Dirksen to GFM 17
October 1934 No. 7 p. 9. (Hereinafter cited as DGFP).
10
Ibid., Series C vol. Ill, Dirksen to Buelow 4 January 1934 No. 162
pp. 298-300.

17
von Dirksen to avoid:

"...any close relations with Japan

which might lay us (Germany) open to being suspected of wishing
11
to render assistance against Russia."
Hitler queried Ribbentrop about more intimate connections
with Japan in late 1934 but Ribbentrop was to busy consolidating
his own position to consider the assignment.

Ribbentrop

negotiated the Anglo-German naval agreement in 1935 and acquired
sufficient influence and prestige to undertake the immediate
need for an agreement with Japan.
The Japanese viewed German efforts in the Far East
with apprehension because of the former German colonies held
by Japan and Germany's offical Sinophile position.

The Japanese

military leaders were not at all certain about Germany's
relations with Russia and presumed that Germany, because of
her close geographical proximity to Russia, feared the Communist
state.

This common fear of Communism became the immediate

pretext for the diplomatic negotiations preceding the signature
of the first German-Japanese alliance.
Russia was not idle with two conflicting ideologies on
her borders in the 1930's. In August, 1935, the seventh
World Congress of the Communist International met in Koscow
to plan world Communist strategy.

The Congress decided to work

in cooperation with Social Democrats of the Popular îTont
movements in Spain and in Prance. But the Communists went
even further, adopting a resolution condemning fascist aggressors
and imperialist warmongers, stating:
ÏÏ

Ibid., Series C vol. Ill, Buelow to Trautmann 12 October 1934
No. 247 p. 480.

18
In the face of the war provocations of the German fascists
and Japanese militarists, and the speeding up of armaments
by the war parties in the capitalist countries...the
central slogan of the Communist Parties must "be: struggle
for peace. All those interested in the preservation of
peace should be drawn into this vital front. The
concentration of forces against the chief instigators of
war at any given moment (at the present time-against fascist
Germany and against Poland and Japan which are in league
with it) constitutes a most important task of the
Communist Parties. 12

The Communist International declared war on Germany and Japan,
This new Russian foreign policy statement was a splendid
argument for German-Japanese collaboration.

The overt threat

presented a convenient opportunity to crystallize an auspicious
partnership between Germany and Japan to counter the
Comintern (Communist International),
Ribbentrop conversed with the Japanese military attache
Oshima to determine the views of the Japanese army toward a
13
proposed defensive alliance against Russia in June, 1935,
Oshima gave no definite reply and wired the General Staff in
14
Tokyo for instructions. The Comintern resolution in August
prompted Ribbentrop to intensify German efforts.

Ribbentrop

wanted to know the opinion of the Japanese army about an
agreement with Germany stipulating that neither Germany nor
Japan would aid Russia if war began between either party
15
and Russia.
12
Report of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist Internationa
(London: Modern Books Ltd., 193o), p. 24.
13
IKTPE, exhibits 477, p. 3508.
14
Ibid., record pp. 3481-3491.
15
Ibid.. exhibits 477, pp. 2762, 3492,

19
The Japanese General Staff replied to Oshima's inquiry

stating that the proposal required further examination.

The

General Staff sent Lieutenant Colonel Wakamatsu of the German
division of General Headquarters to Berlin to ascertain the
views of the German army and the German government concerning
the possibility of concluding an agreement against the Comintern.

Until Wakamatsu's arrival in Berlin in November, 1935 neither
side took any further action.

16
Ribbentrop and General von Blomberg, the Reich Minister
of War, met in Berlin with Wakamatsu in secret conference.

Wakamatsu stated that the Japanese army v/as in favor of a
general treaty,

Ribbentrop in turn suggested that Germany and

Japan conclude a separate anti-Comintern agreement.

Inasmuch

as the seventh Congress of the Communist International declared
both nations to be its enemies, Ribbentrop proposed that Germany
and Japan had a similar need to defend themselves.

Wakamatsu

replied that the Japanese army felt the same way but since
these proposals were Ribbentrop*s and not from the Foreign
Office, he wished to know where the German government stood on
the matter,

Wakamatsu assumed that the German government

preferred a pact against the Comintern rather than a direct
military alliance. There was no further progress in subsequent
talks, and Wakamatsu left Berlin to inform the Japanese army.
The disjunction of Hitler's two foreign policy
organizations made itself blatantly apparent when von Dirksen,

IE
Werner von Blomberg, 1873-1946. German general. He served as
War Minister, CinC of the armed forces but v^as ousted by Hitler
in 1938.

20
the German ambassador, learned of the negotiations in Berlin,
not from his own Foreign Office (v/hich knew nothing of the talks)
17
but from the Japanese General Staff. Von Dirksen endeavored to
inform the German Foreign Office in a memorandum when he stated:
...Japan is the only Great Power which is opposed to the
Soviet Union both on profound ideological grounds and for
a great variety of political reasons, and which, in addition,
appears to be determined to settle these differences by
force of arms as soon as she feels militarily strong enough. 18
Ribbentrop conducted his diplomatic negotiations in such an
oblique manner that Hitler or the Japanese could repudiate
these unoffical contacts, but such methods were to attain the
sought-after alliance.
The year 1936 witnessed a series of crises on the
international scene that sharpened the ideological battle
against Russia and the activities of the Comintern.

In Prance,

the Blum Cabinet, supported by the Popular Pront took office
in June.

The Civil Yfar in Spain began in July with fascist

and Communist elements on opposite sides.

The Spanish Civil War

furnished the Nazis with a potent argument, maintaining that
the war truly represented the outcome of the decisions at the
Comintern Congress.

Germany claimed to be the defender of

western civilization against the insidious influence of the
Comintern.

The conclusive anti-Communist position of the

German government encouraged support in Japanese political
17
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circles for an alliance.

To the Japanese, Nazi foreign policy

appeared to justify a closer relationship with Germany to
counter the activities of the Comintern,
Hitler met the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Viscount
19
Kushakoji, in June, 1936 when the ambassador returned from
Japan with instructions on the suggested alliance with Germany.
Mushakoji stated that Japan regarded Communism as a serious
menace and that: "she looked with great respect on Germany,
who, as Russia's western neighbor, had overcome this danger.
Japan, as a spiritually related country...desired the closest
20

cooperation with Germany."

Ribbentrop presented the German

proposals for a limited agreement with the Japanese, and
21
Mushakoji forwarded the terms to Tokyo,
Ambassador von Dirksen returned to Berlin in 1936 and
discussed the Japanese situation with Ribbentrop. The German
Foreign Ministry knew nothing of the nev/ activities of the
Dienststelle Ribbentrop and von Dirksen had to inform them of
the diplomatic exchanges. Foreign Minister von Keurath was
very suspicious and opposed any political agreement with Japan.
The Wilhelmstrasse made no effort to interfere and allowed
Ribbentrop to continue the negotiations.

The ambassador

returned to Tokyo with the impression that Hitler attached
22
great importance to the negotiations with Japan. Colonel Ott,
19
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20
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the military attache, also returned home to attend the fall

maneuvers of the German army. Hitler asked Ott for his opinion
on the situation in Japan,

Ott replied that the Japanese army

favored the conclusion of a German-Japanese agreement.
Negotiations for the pact began in earnest with this
information and after the Japanese discussed the proposals of
June, 1936. Ribbentrop reported to Hitler on the negotiations

from the first of August with the Japanese military attache
Oshima.

The two parties worked on the various details to

satisfy the Japanese government and were in agreement on the
23
major articles of the pact by mid-August,
The greatest difficulties lay in the provisions of the
secret accords to the pact. Ribbentrop attempted to write a
broad stipulation into the first secret article which dealt
with the actions of either party if one became involved in a
conflict with Russia, The Japanese regarded this provision as a
negative point which put little restraint on either participant.
The Germans compromised on the point but insisted that the
clause plainly designating Russia remain in the article.

The

two parties settled other difficulties on future agreements
with Russia with an exchange of supplementary notes to the
pact.

The Japanese opposed publication of the Anti-Comintern

Pact but Ribbentrop insisted that it be done and the Japanese
army pressured the Japanese Foreign Office to accept.
was some hesitancy
_

There

in Japanese political circles that Germany

DGgP, Series C vol. V, Ribbentrop to Hitler 16 August 1936
No. 509 pp. 099-90O.
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stood to gain immensely and would exploit her position, using
Japan as a tool for her own foreign policy.

The army again

overcame the opposition and the two parties, Rib'oentrop and
Kushakoji, initialled the completed draft on 23 October in
Berlin, in front of Hitler.
The treaty's preamble, written with the intent to
broaden the popular appeal and acceptance of the document,
stated the opposition of the two signatories, Germany and Japan,
to the objectives of the Comintern.

In tho following articles

they agreed to consult each other on Communist activities,
inviting third parties to join the pact.

The pact was to

remain in force for five years with a provision for renewal.
The supplementary protocol dealt v/ith the exchange of information
about the activities of the Comintern and the formation of a
permanent committee to handle the coodination of measures
24
against Communist subversion.
The heart of the pact was in the text of the secret
protocol attached to the public agreement,

Germany and Japan

recognized the threat of Russia and provided in Article one that:
Should
object
by the
itself
of the

one of the High Contracting States become the
of an unprovoked attack or threat of an attack
USSR, the other High Contracting State obligates
to take no measures which tend to ease the situation
USSR... 25

The other secret articles of the protocol dealt with future
treaties between the signatories and Russia with the secret
24
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25
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24
agreement being part of the public agreement against
26

the Comintern.
Ribbentrop and Mushakoji exchanged notes to clarify
certain provisions of the secret protocol,

Mushakoji's notes,

Annexes One and Two, stated that both governments agreed that:
the 'political treaties' referred to in Article II of the
aforementioned Supplementary Agreement do not include either
fishery treaties, or treaties concerning concessions, or
treaties concerning frontier questions between Japan,
Manchukuo, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and the like, which may be concluded between Japan and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 27
In his reply, Ribbentrop confirmed this interpretation.
Ribbentrop's note. Annexes Three and Four of the
secret protocol, stated that;
The German government does not regard the provisions of the
existing political treaties between Germany and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, such as the Rapallo Treaty
of 1922 and the Treaty of Neutrality of 1926, in so far
as they have not become null and void under the conditions
existing at the time the Agreement comes into force, as
being in contradiction to the spirit of the Agreement and
the obligations arising from it, 28
In his reply, Kushakoji stated that his government took note
with sincere satisfaction of this communication.

Both parties

agreed to keep the Annexes secret and reveal them, by mutual
consent, to third parties.
The agreement required the final approval of the
Japanese Privy Council,

Those Japanese in favor stressed the

danger of Russia in the Par East and the growing unrest in the
26
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27
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28
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area. In Japan's view, Germany faced a similar situation in
Europe and it was only natural that the two countries should
cooperate.

Russia, having secured her position in Europe with

alliances between herself, Prance and Czechoslovakia, appeared
ready to devote more time to the Par East, increasing the
threat of Russian intervention. Those Japanese opposed to
the treaty feared widespread repercussions at home and increased
hostility with Russia.

The objections found little support

Eind the Privy Council unanimously approved the Anti—Comintern

Pact on 25 November 1936.
In Berlin, Hitler quickly approved the pact and in
order to justify the agreement, initiated a torrent of antiCommunist propaganda,

Nazi vituperation reached new heights

under the slogan of "the Battle against Bolshevism",

The

German press denounced Russian foreign policy and concluded
that a defensive alliance against Bolshevism was highly
desirable,

Ribbentrop signed the agreement for Germany as

Minister Plenipotentiary at large. The agreement, signed in
the offices of the Dienststelle, rather than the German Foreign
Office and without the signature of Germany's Foreign Minister,
caused a great deal of speculation at the time,

Ribbentrop

explained after the war that the Fuehrer arranged it in that
manner because he wished to denote the pact *s ideological
28
nature and to avoid an offical air. Hitler was not eager to
have von Neurath sign the pact because in case it became
28
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expedient to repudiate the entire project, the fact that the
German Foreign Minister had not approved the agreement would
be of some help.
The major European countries received the news of the
pact with open misgivings and were already wondering if they
might be victims of aggressive designs by either Germany or
Japan.

They assumed that these designs might be brought nearer

to realization now that the two powers suspected of harboring
such designs were openly allied in common cause.

Russia, not

satisfied v/ith the various explanations given to her by the
German ambassador, scorned the agreement. The Russian Foreign
29
Minister, Maxim Litvinov, speaking on 26 November before the
All-Union Congress, gave vent to Russian exasperation when
he stated:
Well-informed people refuse to believe that for the drawing
of the two scanty published articles of the German-Japanese
agreement it was necessary to conduct negotiations for
fifteen months, and that on the Japanese side it v/as
necessary to entrust these negotiations to an Army general,
and on the German side to an important diplomat, and that
it was necessary to conduct these negotiations in an
atmosphere of the strictest secrecy. As regards the
published...agreement, it is only a camouflage for another
agreement which was simultaneously discussed and initially
...(and) in which the word 'Communism' is not even mentioned.30
The Russians were well-informed about the real intention of the
Anti-Comintern Pact. The agreement could only serve to
worsen relations between Germany and Russia.
29
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The British took a dim view of the pact, and its
publication aroused immediate apprehensions for the security
of the Empire. It appeared that the Germans and the Japanese
intended to divide the world on ideological grounds with the
British Empire challenged on all shores.

Italy maintained a

careful reserve and pointedly avoided any indication that she
planned to adhere to the pact in the near future.
spoiled the secrecy when, speaking of;

But Ribbentrop

"Germany...creating

a bulwark against this pestilence (Bolshevism) in Central

Europe," he predicted that soon: "Italy will hoist the anti31
Bolshevist banner in the south." Hitler believed that Italy,
bound by the October Protocols of 1936 with Germany, would
join the Anti-Comintern Pact to create a triple entente.
The German government disclosed that the pact was open
to all other nations as an assurance against the Comintern
threat.

The German press contended that the Japanese were

united in support of the pact—thus ignoring the widespread
opposition in Japan to the agreement,

A publicity campaign

began to promote popular interest in Japanese culture to abet
the political coalition between the two countries.
In Tokyo, the pact received a decidedly unenthusiastic
reception.

The Japanese press, a bit less restricted than its

German counterpart, regarded the agreement as a sudden decision
in foreign policy to decide Japan's friends and enemies.

Tokyo Asahi on 2 December vrcote:
—

Ibid., pp. 299-300.

The

28
In plain language it is too hasty, we should think, for
Japan to decide her foreign policy without first examining
whether England is Japan's friend or enemy. As Chiang
Kai-Shek, of all people, has said...the agreement in
question can by no means help Japan in pursuit of her
policy toward Russia. Why? Because it is impossible to
think that Germany would lend her forces to Japan in
event of any crisis between Japan and Russia. 32
It appeared that the Japanese made lukewarm friends at the
expense of red-hot enemies.

Many Japanese resented being

dragged into European conflicts at the expense of Japan's
independence in foreign affairs.

An analysis of the Anti-Comintern Pact and its
significance must consider Hitler's foreign policy in Europe and
in the Par East.

The pact against the Comintern threatened

Russia in both Europe and in Asia.

The pact menaced Great

Britain and Prance in these same areas.

Because there were no

commitments in the agreement for military action, the pact
was ineffectual in case of war. However, the assumed stipulations
of military obligations extended Germany's influence to
world-wide dimensions. But the provisions of the pact obligated
Germany to accept a policy that was contrary to her previous
diplomatic position.
The German government could not influence Japan's foreign
policy despite Ribbentrop's efforts.

The provisions of the

Anti-Comintern Pact did not include any dangerous obligations,
but Hitler failed to foresee the consequences of Japan's
32
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foreign policy in the Far East, The German government wanted
.to establish closer relations with Japan and at the sarae time,
maintain Germany's influential position in China, This policy
demanded diplomacy far beyond the extent of Ribbentrop'g
ability»

When Japan became involved in a war with China in

1937, Germany had little recourse but to acquiesce to Japanese
requests and to end her aid to China.

The ultimate significance

of the Anti-Comintern Pact was the dependence of German foreign
policy in the Far East on Japan's disposition.
Japan wanted an agreement with Germany to immobilize
Russia in the Far East by threatening her on two borders.

The

Japanese government did not want à definite agreement against
Russia which included military obligations but sought instead
to forestall Russia with the threat of Germany in the west.
Japan did obtain this in the Anti-Comintern Pact and could
proceed with her territorial aggrandizement in China.

The

German government underestimated the character of its ally,
Japan, and this blunder was full of portent when Germany's
real opponent in Europe became not Russia but Great Britain.

CHAPTER III
THE FIRST CRISIS

1937-1938

Germany's position in world affairs seemed rather
auspicious at the beginning of 1937»

The new German government

had reclaimed the Rhineland, and rearmament had reestablished
Germany as the strongest power in central Europe.

The Anti-

Comintern Pact with Japan and the October Protocols with Italy
had given Hitler a measure of security and an instrument to
use against the vacillating diplomats of Europe.

Germany's

stature had risen in Europe and in the Par East. Relations
with Japan had grown on the new political foundation, trade with
Manchuria had been revived and the profitable commerce with
China offered a firm base for a friendly but informal relationship.
Germany did not want to neglect her friendship with
China despite the coalition with Japan, Hitler realized that,
after the Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany needed to maintain a
balance between China and Japan so as not jeopardise the Chinese
trade.

Hitler, receiving the first Chinese ambassador in

1936, stated;

"Germany is anxious carefully to foster and

deepen the friendly relations which have so long existed
between our two countries."

This policy was put to the supreme

test when v/ar began between China and Japan in July, 1937.
Germany found that she could not maintain this foreign policy

I
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31
in the Par Bast in opposition to Japan, and Germany would
have to foresake China to save the entente with Japan,
Japan entered the war against China with her own
slogan, "the Battle against Bolshevism in Asia" but Germany
professed serious doubts about the Communist menace.

The new

Par Eastern v/ar created a visible strain in the diplomatic
relations between the two countries.

The German Foreign Office

sent indentical telegrams to all its missions, stating that:
"Germany will observe strict neutrality in the Par Eastern
2
conflict." Por the sake of German commercial interests in
China and her Anti-Comintern policy, Germany desired a peaceful
solution to the v/ar.

But Germany took no steps to join any

aotdion to stop Japan or to help negotiate a peace settlement,
a move which would have definitely been in Germany's favor to
extricate herself from her awkward position.

The Japanese

ambassador, Viscount Mushakoji, explained the Japanese military
campaign in China to the German Foreign Office as service to
Germany because of its anti-Communist intent. Baron von
3
V/eizsaecker, head of the Political Department, contradicted
the ambassador by pointing out to him that the policy did not
lead to an elimination of Communism in China but would actually
foster the ideology.

The Anti-Comintern Pact had never been

2
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intended to fight Communism in other countries and the war
4
brought Germany no benefits. Two issues, German trade with
China and German military advisors in China, were to renew the
old hostilities between Germany and Japan and place the new
alliance at its most tenuous extreme until Germany sacrificed
her position in the Par East for the bond with Japan.
The issue of German trade with China, much of it in
military equipment, stretched Germany's "strict neutrality"
and sharply delineated the division between the German Foreign
Office and those in the Nazi Party concerned with foreign policy,
Germany was brought face to face with a dilemma that had been
iniierent in the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact.

The longtime Sinophile

attitude of the German Foreign Office and the fear of possible
commercial ruin in business circles enhanced the anti-Japanese
feeling in Germany.

China placed large commercial orders

in Germany for armaments and industrial machinery,

Germany in

turn acquired much needed foreign exchange from these transactions
and also valuable strategic raw materials, including tin and
wolfram.

The German Foreign Office felt that China was a much

better ally than Japan and German businessmen saw in China a
lucrative market with vast economic potential.

The German

Officer Corps supported these pro-Chinese views with its own
unfavorable opinion of the Japanese army.

Many officers

believed that Japan could never occupy the whole of China.
4
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China would remain unconquered and this would result in a
long, protracted war which Japan could not sustain economically
without bringing chaos to the internal structure of the
Japanese economy and nation.
The Japanese acted quickly to demand what was expected
of Germany in their political relationship.

The Japanese

Counselor speaking to Weizsaecker, insisted that all German arms
deliveries to China be halted, including those already contracted
5
by China to Germany. The German Foreign Office attempted to
justify German actions, stating that the export of arms to
China was on a modest scale and regardless of the Anti-Comintern

6
Pact, could, not be made an issue for German-Japanese negotiations.
The German government, in view of its proclamation of
neutrality, agreed to make no new deliveries of arms, but was
nevertheless understandably loath to cancel existing orders.
Hitler ordered that no further Chinese orders be accepted and
that arms shipments to China be camouflaged as much as possible
7
to avoid antagonizing the Japanese, Hitler's disposition
toward Japan endeavored to protect the advantageous Chinese
commerce, an important contribution to the German economy.

The

Japanese, not satisfied by this double talk, threatened to seize
5
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German arms shipments en route to China if Germany did not
8

comply to Japan's demands.
German military advisors in China, ex-officers of the
German army and hired by the Chinese government to create a
modem Chinese army, had absolutely no connection with the
German government on any offical basis. Commanded by General
9
Alexander von Palkenhausen, they did much to promote GermanChinese relations and to increase German influence and prestige
in the Chinese government.

Members of the German Foreign Office

realized that if Japan insisted upon the recall of these advisors,
China might then turn to Russia to provide officers to instruct
Chinese troops. This was the very last thing that Hitler
wanted.

The possibilities of Russian interference grew with the

signature of the Russo-Chinese Non-Aggression Pact on 21 August
1937. The Japanese government demanded late in August that the
German personnel be ordered to leave the country because they
were participating in staff planning and the tactical
disposition and control of Chinese troops fighting the Japanese
invaders.

This military assistance stiffened Chinese resistance.

Berlin warned Palkenhausen not to collaborate but to little
10
avail. Within a brief time from the beginning of the war in
July, Germany faced decisions affecting her entire position
in the Par East.

Germany had to choose between complying v/ith

8
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Japanese requests or see the efforts of the last four years
to esta'bl.ish an accord with Japan wasted,
German foreign policy at this critical point lacked
unity and direction.

The German Foreign Office viewed Japanese

actions in China with alarm and disapproved of the conflict.
The Foreign Office did not want to yield to Japanese demands
against the arms shipments and military advisors, "but although
cognizant of the implications of this stand, lacked the influence
to save the German position in China from destruction. Hitler
pursued a vacillating policy, unable to choose between Germany's
previous interests or the new political alliance with Japan,
In a discussion with von Neurath on 16 August, Hitler stated
that:

"he adhered in principle, to the idea of cooperating

with Japan, but that, in the present conflict between China and
11
Japan, Germany must remain neutral," Hitler's decision on
arms shipments to China conflicted with his previous
pronouncements toward Japan,
The Nazi Party's foreign policy advisors did not foresee
the fatal course of Japan's imperialist policy against China.
Eibbentrop, not concerned with Germany's interest in China,
advocated a strong pro-Japanese position, believing that Japan
12
would win a swift victory over China, Hitler inclined toward
this position also and felt that he must support the AntiComintern Pact in view of the spread of Communism in Spain
ÏÏ
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and China, The pact united Germany and Japan against the
Communist threat,

Germany continued to profess neutrality but by

autumn 1937, the German government, despite the objections of
the Foreign Office, decided to yield to Japanese demands.
Hitler instituted his decision immediately and on
18 October Goering issued orders to halt all arms deliveries
to China.

Goering stated that the Japanese threatened to

withdraw fcom; the Anti-Comintern Pact: "if support of the
Chinese by Germany was continued in its present form and that
the Fuehrer had decided that an unequivocal attitude was to be
13
14
adopted toward Japan," General Wilhelni Keitel protested that
it would not be feasible to stop all deliveries, some of which
China had already paid for, because Germany could not return
the payments.

The Reich Minister of War von Blumberg agreed,

and supported by the Foreign Office, pressured Goering to
15
rescind his order and to resume deliveries. It was quite
clear in Berlin that an end to the Sino-Japanese war, would be
of great benefit to Germany, both from the economic considerations
involved and the political standpoint.

The only hope was for

German mediation in the conflict but this required political
support in Berlin, support which Hitler would not give his
Wilhelmstrasse diplomats.
13
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The Chinese appeal to the League of Nations and the
signatories of the Nine Power agreement resulted in a conference
of interested states in Brussels. Japan indicated from the
outset that she would refuse to attend because she feared
possible collective action by the Western Powers, Hitler
refused to participate because of his pro-Japanese inclination
and because he feared that the conference, if successful, might
establish a precedent in cases of future aggression.

Germany's

absence from Brussels, despite the need for friendship with
both nations, was anti-Chinese and so by inference pro-Japanese.
Germany could not please both powers, and her position in
relation to the conference was an illustration of her dilemma
in the Far East,
The German Foreign Office attempted to mediate the
conflict by offering its good offices to handle the exchanges
between China and Japan,

The German ambassador in China,

Dr, Trautmann, informed the Chinese that Germany could serve as
a mediator in the conflict because direct negotiations appeared

16
most promising.

The Foreign Office made the first move

because of hints received from the Japanese army and its
representative Oshima that the time was ripe for negotiations.
Ambassador von Dirksen received another such Japanese request
through diplomatic channels and conveyed the message to the
17
Wilhelmstrasse. The Foreign Office in turn asked von Dirksen
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if he thought the Japanese government was sincere in its
professed desire for negotiations and instructed him to tell
the Japanese that Germany would not exert overt pressure
on China:
Please tell the Japanese that in our opinion we have done
everything possible since the outbreak of the conflict to
exert a friendly influence on China, and we consider a
more far-reaching pointed move premature. 18
The Chinese expressed a willingness to hear the Japanese terms
and they were conveyed to von Dirksen.
The Japanese government forwarded its peace terms to
China, stating that if China did not accept them, Japan would
continue the war and exact harsher terms in China's complete
defeat.

The terms in brief were: Inner Mongolia was to be

autonomous, 2. Demilitarized zones were to be created in North
China which would be under Chinese administration and headed by
a pro-Japanese ofxical,

The demilitarized zones around

Shanghai were to be extended, 4.

China was to cease her anti-

Japanese activities by complying with certain Japanese requests,
5. She was to join the battle against Bolshevism, 6. China was to
reduce import duties to a lower level, 7. The rights of foreign
powers in China were to be respected.

Von Dirksen judged the

terms acceptable to China without a loss of face and advised
that the German military personnel be utilized to persuade
19
Chiang Kai-shek to agree to the terms. Von Lleurath instructed
18
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Trautmann to convey the terms to the Chinese, adding that
they:

"seem acceptable to us as a basis for the opening
20

of negotiations."

Chiang Kai-shek read the terms and at once declared he
could not accept them for China until Japan restored the
status quo ante bellum in China.

He realized that to negotiate

on the Japanese proposals would mean a revolution in China with

the Communists seizing power.

Trautmann reported this to Berlin

along with the rumor that the Chinese expected Anglo-American
21
support in the mediation.
The massive Chinese defeat around Shanghai in early
November and the general rout toward Nanking prompted the German
diplomats to redouble their efforts to secure peace through
direct negotiations with Japan.

Von Dirksen in Japan proposed

that the German military advisors in China be used to influence
22

Chiang Kai-shek,

General Palkenhausen, at the request of

Trautmann, attempted to point out the disastrous conseouences
25
of a prolonged v/ar to China but with no success. Yon Neurath
pressed the Chinese ambassador in Berlin to agree to negotiate
24
but with similar results. There followed a temporary halt in
20
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the conversations between the three parties.

German diplomatic

efforts accomplished nothing, and the diplomats could only wait
for the seemingly inevitable collapse of China and the end
of Germany's position in that country.
By the end of November, 1937, even the Chinese could
no longer delude themselves that an international conclave in
Europe would rescue them from their plight or that the Chinese
forces could halt the Japanese advance.

These dilatory tactics

were all too evident and, while German diplomats tried
unsuccessfully to convince the Chinese of the necessity to give
ground in the peace negotiations, the Japanese grew more
impatient,

Chiang Kai-shek agreed to negotiate with the Japanese

on 3 December using the first proposals as the basis for the
25
talks. Germany was to act as mediator with the entire
proceedings to be strictly secret.

The Chinese also suggested

that Hitler appeal publicly to both governments to conclude
an armistice and cease hostilities.
In Tokyo, the Japanese General Staff, alarmed at the
expansion of the area of military operations and the increase
in war expenditures, now seemed impatient in its quest for
peace.

Von Dirksen inquired if Japanese demands remained

unchanged from the first proposals, and the Japanese Foreign
26
Office confirmed that there had been no change, Japan hoped
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that Hitler would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to initiate a

27
peace offer to which the Japanese government would then respond,
V/hen the armistice appeared near, the military situation
in China outran the diplomatic negotiations.

On 7 December,

von Dirksen handed the qualified Chinese acceptance to the
Japanese Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister expressed

doubt if the original proposals still sufficed with the Japanese
army ready to seize the Chinese capital at Nanking.

Internal

pressures in Japan stifled any attempts at moderation because
the public and the young officer corps of the army, intoxicated
by the series of new military successes, demanded adequate
28
compensation for their sacrifices. The army felt the pressure
of the lower ranks—the radical wing of the army—for the
imposition of severe terms and the army could only comply
to these demands*
This decision by the Japanese government stunned the
German Foreign Office, but von Neurath nevertheless decided
that Germany should continue to offer her good offices.

He did

instruct von Dirksen to intimate to the Japanese that Germany
could not go transmitting in good faith to China terms which
Japan kept extending to a harsher level.

The Japanese government

forwarded the new terms to von Dirksen on 22 December, stating
that in view of the rapid changes in the military situation,
the following became necessary:
27
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pro-Communist and anti-Japanese policies, 2. Demilitarized
zones and.special regimes were to be established in certain
areas, 3» Agreements for close economic cooperation should be
concluded between Japan, China and Manchukuo, and 4. Japan
29
was to paid an indemnity, Japan also demanded direct
negotiations with no cessation of hostilities until the conclusion
of peace,

Japan insisted that China recognize Manchukuo and

join the Anti-Comintern Pact to counter the recently concluded
Sino-Russian Non-Aggression Pact.

There were other stipulations

for a demilitarized zone in the Yangtze Valley and a general
tariff and trade agreement.

Japan expected China's answer

by the end of the year.
Von Dirksen protested the threatening tone of the
harsh Japanese peace terms and considered it improbable that
China would accept such conditions.

When von Neurath received

the proposals, he expressed serious doubts.

He finally decided

to forward the terms to China but warned Trautmann in China to
50
refrain from expressing any opinion on the proposals.
Ambassador Trautmann conveyed the Japanese terms to
the Chinese government whose representative professed shock at
such demands.

The Chinese requested an elaboration of the

main points and threatened to turn to Russia for aid.

The

German Foreign Office persuaded the Japanese to extend their
29
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time limit and urged the Japanese government to moderate its
31
terms. General Falkenhausen and Trautmann did their upmost
to convince Chiang Kai-shek to accept the terms because of
Chinais desperate position, but the latter felt the revised
proposals to be impossible for his country.
The Japanese government submitted a third set of
proposals of nine points clearly intended to wreck the
negotiations.

The new terms, an effort by the Japanese army

to confuse the Chinese and to rupture the negotiations completely,
were vague and indefinite.

On 12 January, Trautmann, advised

of new ominous developments on the Japanese General Staff,
warned the Chinese government that the Japanese would wait
32
no longer for a reply. The Chinese Foreign Minister declared
that the proposals of late December were too broad and that
China wished to know the real content of the Japanese demands.
Von Dirksen communicated this reply to the Japanese Foreign
Office.

He attempted to mollify the Japanese and suggested that

if the negotiations were to end, world opinion would blame
the Japanese government.
The Japanese regarded the Chinese answer as plain
subterfuge and lacking in sincerity.

The Japanese government

decided to attempt no further contacts with the Chinese.
Von Dirksen expressed his regret at this hasty decision and
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warned that the continuation of the struggle would have
unfavorable effects on the relations between Germany and Japan.
The war with China would worsen Anglo-Japanese relations,
which Germany considered undesirable, and it would encourage
Communism in China.

Moreover, the protraction of the war

33
would weaken Japan in its ideological struggle with Russia.
German mediation came to an end, and despite some
half-hearted attempts by the Chinese, it could not be revived.
The Japanese attitude in the government and in the army were of •
such a nature to discourage all further efforts.

The German

Foreign Office, especially ambassadors von Dirksen and Trautmann,
struggled, under extenuating circumstances, to achieve peace
but there never was a real chance.

There was a lack of

direction in the German government, typified by Hitler's proJapanese stand, which provided no basis of strength for the
negotiations.

Hitler's own foreign policy was at cross-purposes

with the German Foreign Office.

While recognizing Germany's

considerable economic interests and political position in
China, he refused to take any step which might jeopardize the
alliance with Japan.

Hitler moved to acknowledge Japanese

hegemony in China and to terminate Germany's involvement in
1
Asiatic affairs.
The German government acted quickly to facilitate the
change in German foreign policy.

Hitler's decision on China

involved a change in the Foreign Office, based in part on a
33
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report received from von Dirksen in Tokyo,

The report

recommended that Germany recognize Manchukuo, stop all deliveries
of arms and munitions to China, and recall the German military
personnel.

Von Dirksen believed that China would drift into

the Russian orbit and it would be better to withdraw the
German advisors rather than have them collaborate with Russian
personnel.

This was necessary in order to avoid an
34
estrangement in relations with Japan. Hitler needed to bring

the Foreign Office under his complete control with a change
in the Foreign Ministry to one favorably disposed to his
55
pro-Japanese attitude. The one man who strongly espoused the
appropriate position and whose chimerical outlook of world
affairs pleased Hitler, was Ribbentrop,

Hitler replaced

von Neurath with his own lackey, Ribbentrop, on 4 February 1938.
With the last vestiges of opposition removed, the way was now
open for the full implementation of Nazi foreign policy.
Hitler decided to recognize Manchukuo as an independent
state.

He publicly announced this decision in the course of a

speech before the Reichstag on 20 February when he justified
36
the act as: "a sober respect for actual fact." Hitler went
on to state:
_

I cannot agree v/ith those politicans who think they do
Europe a service in harming Japan, I am afraid the defeat

34
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of Japan in Eastern Asia would never benefit Europe or
America, but only Bolshevist Soviet Russia. I do not
consider China strong enough, either spiritually or
materially, to withstand from her ov/n resources any
attack by Bolshevism...Germany, in the defensive attitude
she adopts toward Communism, will always regard and
value Japan as an element of security, and a guaranty,
moreover, for the culture of mankind, 37
Hitler left no doubt that while German neutrality would continue
along with hopes for peace between China and Japan, he accepted
the Japanese plea that they were fighting Communism in China,
which hitherto the German Foreign Office refused to countenance.
To emphasize the change in German foreign policy, Hitler
recalled von Dirksen from Tokyo and replaced him with the
military attache, now Major General Ott—an unusual event in
German diplomatic practice and full of portent.
The surrender of the German position in China now
proceeded apace.

Hitler and Ribbentrop were ready to sacrifice

the goodwill of China and valuable commercial position of
Germany in that country for the primacy of politics.

Goering

issued orders halting the export of all war material immediately
irrespective of the dates of conclusion on the delivery
39
contracts. He repeated the order in May because German
deliveries somehow kept reaching the Par East.

The cancellation

of these contracts caused a considerable loss to the German
armament firms.

The recall of German personnel, initially
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decided in April, but delayed by Chiang Kai-shek, was of
special concern.

Ribbentrop advised Trautmann to order

General Palkenhausen to quit his military position.

Palkenhausen

replied that such a move would be of special concern, a
breach of contract and the men under his command would not
leave China.

Trautmann supported this decision in an attempt

to save the German position in China.
relent and was adamant.

But Ribbentrop did not

In early May he promised that the

advisors would be withdrawn and repeated his order that the
advisors leave as soon as possible; the German government
paying their return fares and compensating them for their loss
40
of further salary. The consequent wrangle between Ribbentrop
and Trautmann led to the recall of the ambassador.

On 28 June,

when a delay occurred in the departure of the German advisors,
Ribbentrop ordered Trautmann to hand over his office to the
,
41
Charge d'affaires and return to Germany. This was the final
blow in the self-destruction of Germany's influence in China.
The Japanese war not only eliminated German commerce in China
but forced Germany to relinquish her privileges in China to
Japan.

Germany's sacrifice received little recompense

from Japan.
The considerable German business interests in China
which flourished in the post-war era under favorable auspices
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faced ruin with the German retreat from China.

Not only had

the normal economic exchange been destroyed between Germany
and China, but the extensive arms trade, at one time estimated
to be from 50 to 80^ of China's war resources, came to an
42
abrupt end, Ribbentrop attempted to negotiate with the
Japanese government for compensation of the lost industries,
war damage claims and a guarantee of equal opportunity for
German businessmen in China.

The Japanese government would

only promise Germany commercial opportunities as good as third
powers because it did not want to antagonize Great Britain or
the United States by openly violating the principle of
equality of opportunity.

The two partners could not even

agree on the form of a projected understanding for a commercial
treaty and the conversations deadlocked.

Ribbentrop's attempt

failed to bring German businessmen any compensation for their
losses in China.

Japan charged her toll and Germany paid

in full the price of the Anti-Comintern Pact and for
Japan's friendship.

The German Foreign Office was well aware that Japan's
ploy to eradicate Communism from China to justify the war would
have the opposite effect in China.

The Japanese army did not

conquer China, Chiang Kai-shek refused to capitulate and
Communism thrived under these conditions, proving to be the
ultimate victor in the Sino-Japanese war,
42
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Japan lost her
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calculated venture against China and unfortunately not only
the stakes of her own empire but a substantial German interest
as well.

Japan, having seized a major portion of China in a

surge of national expansion, would not share her gains with
Germany.

Japan had the unexampled superiority of possessing

her strength in Asia while Germany, in the geographical
circumstances of this situation, could not possibly hope to
counter this through mediation.

Germany, lacking other outposts

in the Par East and dependent upon the goodwill of Great
Britain for her connection to Asia, could not force a solution.
Germany's earnest endeavors for peace had little chance for
success because Japan's desires were sufficiently large to be
prohibitive to negotiations.

The German government tried to

maintain a delicate balance between China and Japan in the Far
East, trying to please both without offending either.

The

attempt failed and Hitler made his decision, sacrificing the
valuable economic privileges in China to retain the political
friendship of Japan,
This decision appeared to be a mistake but viewed from
its own environment in Nazi foreign policy, there v/as
substantial justification.
despised mercenary gain,

Nazi ideology adulated power and

Germany's relations with China,

through profitable, were devoid of a forceful quality.

But

Japan, in Hitler's mind, epitomized the very sinew of strength—
the samurai warrior state.

Hitler regarded Japan as a more

valuable ally against Russia, Great Britain or the United
States than China could ever hope to be.

From this point of

50
view in world strategy, Hitler resolved the German dilemma
in the Par East and opted for Japan,

That German "business

interests suffered consequent disadvantages was unfortunate
but Hitler calculated that to work with China, a weak nation,
would restrict his freedom of action in foreign policy.

Japan

occupied a definite place in Hitler's world strategy and it
was from this position that steps were taken to strengthen
the bond between Germany and Japan with a definite military
alliance between the two nations.

CHAPTER IV
THE AXIS TRIANGLE

1937-1939

Germany in 1937 faced a new protagonist in Europe—
Great Britain.

Hitler could not settle the question of

Lebensraum in Eastern Europe through negotiations with Great
Britain.

The accession of Italy to the Anti-Comintern Pact

presented a way in which to overcome this obstacle.

The

strategic value of Italy would be her threat to the British
in the Mediterranean.

Mussolini would act as Hitler's navy.

The coalition assumed a new character with this challenge to
Great Britain as well as the secret accords against Russia.
Germany, Italy and Japan presented a formidable political
block of nations against Great Britain and Russia but this was
only so long as peace prevailed.

The Anti-Comintern Pact did

not have any basis for military action or assistance in
case of aggression.
Hitler reasoned that Japan ?/as in a similar situation
in the Far East with the assistance that Great Britain and
Russia gave to China.

The tv/o governments had a common goal in

their foreign policies to strengthen the coalition against
Russia, and now Great Britain, with the creation of a
military alliance.
The Anti-Comintern Pact had been ostensibly directed
against the Communist International but the secret protocols
had provided that Germany and Japan would consult each other
in the event of a threatened or actual attack by Russia.
51

The

52
pact had committed each partner to nothing more than benevolent
neutrality and fell short of containing definite military
obligations.

Germany, in the initial negotiations, had

favored a military commitment but then had retracted her
proposals to assure the completion of some form of agreement
with Japan.

In 1956, the Japanese General Staff, through its

military attache in Berlin, had offered the German government
a military understanding but these proposals, repeated in 1957,
were considered premature and unfavorable by Hitler,

A

technical liaison for intelligence had been established
between the German and the Japanese General Staffs in 1957, but
it was limited to the Russian military situation.

The occasion

for a stronger alliance, a triple alliance including Italy,
who had adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1957, was
considered by both Ribbentrop and Hitler,
Ribbentrop, while ambassador to Great Britain in 1957,
explained his views for a German military alliance with Italy
and Japan in a memorandum to the German Foreign Office. He
stated that a revision of Germany's position in Eastern Europe
could only be achieved through the use of force, a policy which
would inevitably clash v/ith the French alliance system.

A war

with Prance would bring Great Britain into the conflict but
Ribbentrop believed that the French would not fight if they
understood that Great Britain would not support them.

This

situation could be realized by the superior forces of a

1
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coalition threatening the British Empire.

If Great Britain

could be "neutralized", Prance would cease to be a problem.
Eibbentrop regarded Great Britain as Germany's primary enemy
and considered a German-Italian-Japanese alliance the best
possible method to check Great Britain in the Par East, in the
Mediterranean and in Europe.

This tripartite coalition would

need a firm military foundation to permit no doubt about the
2
intentions of the signatories. These ideas soon directed
Germany's foreign policy.
The Japanese General Staff principally sponsored the
strategy for a military alliance between Germany and Japan.
The Japanese objectives centered on the conclusion of the China
war, prolonged by the support received from Great Britain and
Russia.

An alliance might reduce this aid and Japan could

draw an advantage once again from the European political scene.
But the Japanese army and the Japanese government could not
agree on the precise content of an understanding.

The government

considered an alliance specifying Russia as sufficient to
terminate the Chinese war but the army wanted to include the
other world powers.

The divisions between the army and the

navy compounded the situation,
Eibbentrop initiated negotiations in January 1958, when
he asked the military attache Oshima if the German-Japanese
bond could not be strengthened with a military understanding.
Oshima transmitted the proposals at once to the General Staff
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3
in Tokyo.

Germany annexed Austria in March 1938, but Japan

did not reply,

A report from the new Japanese ambassador to
4
Berlin, Shigenori Togo, to the Japanese Foreign Office explained
the silence.

He considered an alliance with Germany to be

undesirable since her policy in Europe was leading toward war.
This dissenting opinion created friction between the civilian
and military officals in Tokyo, causing hesitation and delay.
The German government, with Ribbentrop as Foreign
Minister, viewed the projected alliance with Japan as an ever
more important facet of its foreign policy.

Ribbentrop directed

his efforts against Great Britain, v/ho now seemed to provide
the most opposition to Germany in Europe.

The early enemy,

Russia, crippled herself with the purge trials.

Ribbentrop

offered Italy a treaty of mutual assistance within the framework
of a tripartite coalition but the Italians refused when they
learned that Germany had no firm agreement with Japan. Ribbentrop
was not too successful as yet with his grand coalition.
It took the Japanese army the entire spring of 1938 to
realize that the war in China could not be ended by military
means.

The Japanese General Staff instructed Oshima to reopen

discussions with Ribbentrop to negotiate a consultative pact
against Russia.

Ribbentrop replied that a consultative pact

was weak and one-sided; instead, he proposed a mutual aid treaty

3
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aimed not only at Russia but against all countries,

Oshima

doubted that his government would be willing to accept such
commitments.

The Japanese Foreign Office protested any military

commitment to Hitler, who seemed prone to risk everything for
his ambitions.

But the clash with the Russian army at Changkufeng

in China in July 1938 quelled the opposition.

The Japanese

army, fully aware of the Russian threat in China, would pay
the price for an alliance with Germany against Russia, even if
the price meant commitments against other world powers,
Ribbentrop submitted a draft of a treaty to the Japanese,
consisting of three articles, the third of which stipulated
military assistance in case one of the other signatories was
5
attacked. The Japanese government discussed the proposals
during the first half of August and with great dispatch,
extraordinary for the Japanese, gave their limited acceptance
of the draft.

The qualifications of the acceptance included the

decision that all powers other than Russia would have to be
regarded as strictly secondary and Japan's automatic participation
in case of war could not be promised.

Ribbentrop received

this muddled acceptance from Oshima and labored under the
impression that Japan agreed to his entire proposal.

This

mistake became the first cause for much subsequent confusion.
The Munich crisis reached its climax and Ribbentrop's
attention became almost wholly occupied in European affairs.
The crisis in Europe demonstrated how easily Japan might be
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dragged into a conflict were she allied with Germany,

The

events ig Europe caused a partial withdrawal from Japan's
original position toward a military alliance and explained
in part the later fruitless negotiations.
During the Munich crisis, Ribbentrop submitted a revised
i

draft of the proposed tripartite pact to the Italian Foreign
Minister,

The third article of the proposed alliance now

promised "aid and assistance" were one of the signatories to

6
be attacked,

Ribbentrop believed that the time was right for

an alliance.

Hitler regarded v;ar as likely in four or five

7
years, with the western powers and Russia already in a coalition.
Munich demonstrated how weak the western powers were and it
only increased the tendency toward isolation in the United
States.

Hitler concluded that Japan's participation in a

tripartite agreement could only strengthen her position
8
in the Pacific,
Events in Japan reflected the confused situation in
government circles on the question of a tripartite accord.

The

appointment of Oshima as ambassador to Germany appeared to be
a favorable development, supporting those who sought the alliance.
But the Japanese Foreign Office would not yield on its objections
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against a broad pact, aimed at both the western powers and
Russia. .This renewed hesitation, unknown to Ribbentrop, and
the Japanese army's pressure for a full alliance caused the
Japanese government to resign.

The constant problem of the

war in China complicated the negotiations and halted any
further Japanese attempts to induce the Geîmans to soften
the tone of the proposed tripartite pact.
The Axis triumphs in Czechoslovakia and Albania, coupled
with the protracted Chinese war, led to a réévaluation of the
Japanese position by the new Japanese government.

The government

now decided to accept in principle the terms of the proposed
agreement but declared that for political and economic reasons,
Japan would not be able to sign such an accord at the present
time for various obligations.
Ribbentrop endeavored to convince the Italians to adhere
to a tripartite pact.

Late in 1938 Mussolini decided to

accept the terms of the accord and Ribbentrop immediately
9
prepared a draft for signature in early January 1939. But when
Ribbentrop pressed Oshima for a confirmation of Japan's
acceptance of the draft, he learned that Japan was by no means
ready to sign any proposal.

The German plan, completely upset,

had to accept the news in good terms in view of Japan's
importance in the projected tripartite understanding.
Ribbentrop, still confident that an agreement could soon

T
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be reachea, received the Japanese proposals in April 1939.

The

Japanese government wanted to limit the accord to a general
military treaty against Russia alone.

All other states were

minor objectives and Japan would onl^ participate in a war
against them at her own discretion. Ribbentrop, greatly
disappointed, replied that if the Japanese could not accept in
principle military obligations against other powers, he could
not consent to their desire to give a different interpretation
of the pact in various explanations to these powers.

He

supported an oral agreement after the public pact had been signed
which would practically absolve Japan from joining in active
hostilities against any power except Russia.

But Ribbentrop

objected to any written agreement on this because if it became
known to others, it would seriously weaken the value of the pact.
The Japanese indecision exasperated the German
government. Hitler did not want to conclude anything less than
a general military treaty but Ribbentrop could not obtain this
commitment.

On 20 April Ribbentrop warned Oshima that

should Japan continue to delay, Germany might be forced to seek
12
a non-aggression pact v/ith Russia, Hitler made a bid for
Japanese support on 28 April when he stated;
To create still closer relations between Germany, Italy
and Japan is the constant aim of the German government.
We regard the existance and maintenance of the freedom and
independence of these three Great Powers as the strongest
15
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factor in the future making for the preservation of a
true human culture, a practical civilization, and a
just order in the world, 13
The Japanese Prime Minister responded to Hitler's
message with a personal note on 4 May.

He declared that Japan

was honestly desirous of concluding a pact and sincere in her
readiness to extend aid, including military assistance, to
Germany, should she be assailed by third powers, and even if
Russia were not among these.

But in Japan's existing situation,

she was not able to render effective military aid, at the
moment or in the near future, although she would when
circumstances would permit.

The Prime Minister asked that

Germany agree to a secret understanding to excuse Japan from
her obligations of military assistance for the time being, and
allow her to give an innocuous explanation when the pact was
published.

He added that to doubt Japan's sincerity would

destroy the real basis for any agreement and make its future
14
signature impossible.
The Japanese note failed to convince Ribbentrop of
Japan's good faith.

He suspected that if Germany agreed to a

secret written agreement of the kind that Japan wanted, the
Japanese government would use the public pact to try to
blackmail the major powers in the Pacific.

If this proved

unsuccessful, the government might then reveal the secret
provisions of the pact to these powers as proof that Japan was
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not irrevocably committed to a war against them if they became
engaged in a war against the Axis, Germany and Italy, in Europe,
Ribbentrop concluded a bilateral agreement, "the Pact of
Steel", with Italy although he did not altogether abandon the
idea of a tripartite agreement.

But the conclusion of a separate

German-Italian accord meant that Hitler's interest in the
15
Japanese pact was not as strong as before,
Ribbentrop sent new drafts of the latest revision of the

16
proposed tripartite pact to Japan on 15 May,

The revised draft

stressed the defensive nature of the agreement, giving Japan
the right to state that it was directed primarily against
Russia,

But Japan could not give assurances that it would

operate against that power alone, or that under no circumstances
would Japan engage in hostilities against the western powers.
These were substantial concessions by the German government,
Ribbentrop instructed his ambassador in Tokyo to urge the
Japanese government to accept, pointing out that the consolidation
of Japan's position in Asia under the "Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere" depended on the Axis being superior to
their opponents,

Japan could not allow these hostile powers

to assume they could count on Japan's neutrality in the event
17
of a war in Europe,
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Renewed fighting around Komonhan in northern China
between Russia and Japan in May 1939» and the new German
proposals provoked a crisis in the Japanese government. The
army wanted to sign an agreement immediately, but the navy
vigorously opposed any commitment against the major powers,
including the United States. The navy pleaded that Japan could
not survive economically with the oceans dominated by the
combined fleets of the major world powers.

On 21 May the

Japanese government issued a statement indicating that while
Japan sympathized with Germany and Italy in desiring changes
in the territorial status quo, Japan had to maintain her
freedom of action.

The offical signature of the "Pact of

Steel" on 22 May spurred the Japanese government to make one
more supreme- effort to conclude a treaty with Germany.
The Japanese government formulated a compromise in a
stormy meeting on 5 June. The proposal embodied practically
all of the points of Ribbentrop's revised draft of May. Japan
agreed not to inform the major powers about the nature of the
agreement and also conceded to the German demand for at least
pro-forma participation in case of an Anglo-German war. But
the government instructed Oshima to inform Ribbentrop that
Japan would be unable to render effective military aid for
some time.

The Japanese proposal had one reservation; while

in case of war with Russia her entry would be automatic, in all
other instances Japan wished to reserve her freedom of choice
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19
in declaring war until the appropriate moment. Ribhentrop,
faced, with a possible Anglo-Russian entente, rejected the
Japanese offer, refusing to accept anything other than an oral
declaration on Japanese entry into the war. The RibbentropOshima talks deadlocked and came to an end in mid-June.
Hitler decided to move against Poland and his first task
was to isolate that country in Europe. His approach to Russia
in May was a serious effort to avoid a two-front war.

If

Japan would not sign a military treaty, perhaps Russia would
agree to mutual guarantees—there would be harm in trying
both ways.

On 25 May 1939 at a military conference, Hitler

explained the German position with Japan:
Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various
reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat
cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own
interests to take the initiative in attacking Russia
in good time. 20
Hitler wanted to take no chances. He would forestall the
major powers without an alliance with Japan. Hitler ordered
Ribbentrop to prceed with the negotiations for a German-Russian
21
non-aggression pact.
The news of the non-aggression pact between Germany and
Russia stunned Oshima and shocked the Japanese government. The
government considered the signature an extremely dangerous.
19
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treacherous act and a contravention of the Anti-Comintern Pact,
The German-Russian agreement destroyed the whole basis of
22
Japanese foreign policy in Europe. Ribbentrop argued that
Japan could not stand apart. If Great Britain and Russia,
both of whom opposed Japan in China, defeated the Axis in
Europe, Japan would be isolated, Japan would also face a
hostile United States, who could be reckoned as a potential
enemy. Ribbentrop instructed Ott to advise the Japanese
government that Germany had no alternative owing to the
23
critical situation in Europe,
Hitler did not feel any anxiety from the bitter
Japanese reaction, indeed he appeared optimistic almost to the
point of being megalomaniacal.

Addressing his military leaders

at Obersalzberg on 22 August, he exclaimed that:

"since

Autumn 1938, I have found out that Japan does not go with us
24
without conditions..,! have decided to go with Stalin,"
He went on:
We must take into account the defection of Japan. I have
left to Japan a whole year's time to decide. The Emperor
is the companion piece of the late Czars. Weak, cowardly,
irresolute, he may fall before a revolution. My association
with Japan was never popular. We will furthermore cause
unrest in the Par East... Let us think of ourselves as
masters and consider these people at best as lacquered
half-monkeys, who need to feel the knout. 25
22
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Hitler's opinion of the Japanese was not high. He realized
that without a firm military agreement, Japan would be of
little use to Germany.

Hitler expressed these thoughts to

Mussolini three days later:
Japan would probably agree to an alliance against Russia,
which would have only a secondary interest, under prevailing
circumstances, for Germany, and in my opinion, for Italy
also. She would not, however, undertake definite obligations
against England, and this, from the standpoint not only
of Germany, but also of Italy, was of decisive importance. 26
Political expediency forced Hitler to conclude his pact with
Russia to insure the success of his war against Poland. Japan
simply would not ally herself with the Axis and Hitler did not
want a partner who would not strengthen his position in
Europe.

Thus ended the abortive negotiations of 1959 for a

tripartite agreement.

The failure of the negotiations for a tripartite pact
in 1939 was due in part to two illusions which dominated Hitler's
world strategy.

He made a mistake in his general diplomatic

calculations. Hitler sought an alliance with Japan in order to
"neutralize" Great Britain by posing a threat to her empire
through a tripartite coalition. Faced v/ith antagonists in
Europe, the Mediterranean, and in the Par East, Great Britain
would not fight and Prance, not daring to oppose Germany alone,
would cease to be a problem. Russia, confronted with a hostile
2E
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Germany and Japan on either side, would be too isolated to
offer any resistance. This international manipulation of
world politics far exceeded the diplomatic ability of Hitler
and certainly was beyond the grasp of Ribbentrop.

Hitler's

belief that he could accomplish this diplomatic coup was the
first fallacy in his world strategy.
The second illusion v/as even more significant in Hitler's
relations with Japan. Hitler simply did not comprehend the
national objectives of Japan's foreign policy, which were not
the same as his own. Hitler wanted the J^anese alliance to
cause difficulties for the major powers in their colonial
possessions in the Par East, But Japan hoped to settle the
Chinese war by having Germany start a vfar in Europe, or at
least create- such unrest there that Great Britain, Prance and
Russia would be unable to devote their attention to the Par
East.

This difference in national policies by each ally meant

a different interpretation of a potential military understanding;
Germany wanted a general inclusive alliance and Japan only a
limited one. Japan realized that if she signed a general
military alliance, Japan might have to carry the main burden of
the war and face greater odds because of her economic dependence
on the high seas.

This conflict in foreign policy objectives

was the ultimate reason for the absence of a German-Japanese
coalition in 1939 and constituted the second fallacy in
Hitler's world strategy.

CHAPTER V
THE TRIPARTITE PACT

1939-1940

The conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression
Pact shocked the Japanese government, Rihbentrop warned the
Japanese diplomats that if they continued to delay and
procrastinate over the terms of the proposed tripartite pact,
Germany might be forced to turn to Russia for her ovm safety in

1
Europe. This warning in April and a similar one in June by
Ribbentrop did not convice Japan that Germany was indeed serious
2

in her intentions,

Oshima believed that Ribbentrop used these

threats as a bluff to get the Japanese government to sign the
agreement and Germany would not deliberately violate the
Anti-Comintern Pact,
Japan found herself deserted, almost dismissed by
Germany in favor of her worst enemy, Russia. Hitler's latest
diplomatic deceit came at a critical time for the Japanese,
fighting throughout the summer in a border war against the
Russians.

The Japanese government highly resented the German

action because it appeared to give Russia a free hand in the
Par East against Japan.

The new German-Russian Non-Aggression

Pact for all intents and purposes rendered the Anti-Comintern
Pact a worthless scrap of paper.

The German-Japanese entente

Ï
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entered a new period of crisis and hostility.
!&he Reich State Secretary Weizsaecker told Oshima the
news and then urged that Japan consider collaboration among
the three powers.

Such a move could help settle the Japanese

differences with Russia, a point the German government never
3
failed to stress thereafter, Ribbentrop instructed Ott to
explain the German position to the Japanese government in Tokyo.
Ott endeavored to assuage Japanese feelings when he met with
the Japanese Foreign Minister on 25 August, Ott explained the
motives for the pact in regard to Germany's critical position
in Europe at the moment,

Germany had no alternative and the

German-Russian agreement would be of benefit to Japan since it
would enable the German government to use its influence for the
4
improvement of Japanese-Russian relations.
The beginning of war on 1 September initiated a new
diplomatic effort by Ribbentrop to convince the Japanese
government of the benefits of the new alliance with Russia,
In German foreign policy, the treaty with Stalin was not a
breach of trust, because the abortive alliances with Japan in
1936 was against Russia, Great Britain, not Russia, was now
the enemy and the war only intensified this German attitude,
Ribbentrop met with Oshima and argued that Japan's fate hinged
on a German victory in Europe, If Germany was to lose, a
coalition of the western powers and the United States would soon
3
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deprive Japan of her Par Eastern possessions.

He proposed

that Japan take advantage of the German detente with Russia and
allow the German government to mediate to secure a JapaneseRussian rapprochement and a possible diplomatic accord.

Such

an agreement between Japan and Russia could end the frontier
problems in China and allow Japan to extend her influence
5
southward for further expansion against Great Britain.
The new Japanese government, the last one having fallen
on the news of the German-Russian pact in late August, received
the proposals in not a wholly unfavorable atmosphere.

Many

extremists advocated a German-Russian-Japanese alliance with a
rapid advance against British interests in the south. The
Japanese army was not opposed to the plan but the forces against
such an alliance did not forget Germany's conduct in August.
Those opposed remained adamant in their opposition to an
alliance and the removal of several pro-German officals in the
new government strengthened this opposition.

There would be

no alliance at this time.
Japan, seemingly isolated after the German-Russian pact,
found that the war in Europe gave her great freedom of action
in the Far East. The Japanese government declared its
neutrality—or non-involvement in the war as it preferred to call
it—on 4 September.

The government then proceeded to ask the

belligerent powers to voluntarily withdraw their troops and
ships from China in order to avoid incidents.

The undeclared

5
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war between Japan and Russia on the Chinese border came to an
abrupt h^t. The Japanese army, unprepared to fight a long
war with Russia and without German support, desired a quick
truce. The Japanese ambassador to Russia, Togo, arranged the
truce on 16 September without German diplomatic aid. Japan
now appeared to be free to advance in Asia with her major

antagonists involved in war in Europe, and with the Russian
problem temporarily settled in the north.
6
Hitler and Ribbentrop received General Juichi Terauchi
of the Japanese General Staff in November 1959, and attempted

to reconcile the recent hostility between the two nations.
Both men pointed out that no divergence of political interests
existed between Berlin and Tokyo and that any division would
only aid their mutual enemies. Ribbentrop said that Germany
signed the accord with Russia alone but that he talked with
Stalin about the question of a Russian-Japanese agreement, and
Stalin declared: "if the Japanese desire war, they can have
7
war, if they desire an understanding, they can have that too."
General Terauchi agreed with the German position and Ribbentrop
promised to work for such an accord between the three nations.
Ribbentrop did press for a Russo-Japanese agreement in
Moscow after the victory in Poland but the Japanese ambassador
Togo, wary of the Germans, refused to give his support to

z
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8
the scheme. Hitler reassured Oshima that Germany had no
interest-in territorial acquisitions in Asia and that each
nation had separate, distinct interests.

He did not want

Japan to enter the war and wished only that she recognize
9
Great Britain as the common enemy» Bibbentrop repeated this
statement in a discussion with the new Japanese ambassador
10
to Berlin* These diplomatic maneuvers reflected the course
of the war late in 1939 and the knowledge that Great Britain
did not intend to allow Germany to have Eastern Europe.

This

meant a long war and Germany wanted to secure her friendship
with Japan as a part of German world strategy.

Hitler's sudden change in foreign policy with the
German-Russian pact caused much consternation and profound
indignation in Tokyo, Japan appeared utterly isolated and
under ordinary circumstances this might have ended the GermanJapanese relationship. But Hitler and Ribbentrop believed
that Japan's animosity would be of short duration and that she
11
would soon follow Germany's lead. This conclusion was correct
8
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for several reasons, all of which contributed to make the
diplomatic crisis between the two nations only a small interlude,
Japan's own aggressive intentions drove her back to
the Axis camp.

The war in Europe and the subsequent political

upheavals opened the rich European colonies for conquest.

The

truce with Russia ended the border war in the north and Japan
could now conduct a more aggressive policy in the Far East,
taking advantage of the international situation created by
Germany.

The diplomatic crisis quickly passed v/ith these

advantages available.

Ribbentrop now only would have to wait

for the events in Europe to induce Japan to seek a military
alliance with Germany to assure her share of the German victories.
The end of the "Phoney War" and the collapse of Prance led to
the climax in Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan.

The conquest of Norway and the cataclysmic events in
May 1940, with the invasion of the low countries and Prance
caused a resurgence of Germany's more familiar line of foreign
policy. In 1958 Ribbentrop expounded the idea of posing a
triple threat to the British Empire to "neutralize" Great
Britain and isolate Prance.

The plan did not succeed in 1958-

1939 but in 1940 such an idea acquired a new look.

Hitler

repeatedly stated that Great Britain's failure to capitulate
was attributable only to the hope that the United States would
enter the v/ar on her side.

Obviously the United States needed

to be "neutralized" to prevent her from supplying Great Britain
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to any extent and to force the English to surrender.

This

desired situation could best be achieved with a German-Japanese
military agreement which would pose a threat to the United
States in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, This idea
quickly matured' in German diplomacy through the summer of 1940
12
when United States support assumed unexpected proportions.
Japan viewed the German domination of Europe and
considered it the right time for closer relations with the Axis
through a military alliance. A new Japanese government, headed
15
by Prince Fumimaro Konoye and the pro-German Foreign Minister
14
Yasuki Matsuoka, believed the situation highly favorable for
the construction of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"
in Asia.

Japan did not want to lose the Dutch East Indies or

the extensive British possessions and suspected that the German
government might develop aspirations for its own colonial
empire. The Japanese navy feared the British fleet, but since
the United States still appeared unwilling to emerge from her
isolation, it was clear in Tokyo that Japan could waste no time
in placing her claims for territories in Asia.

The Japanese

government formulated a policy to facilitate these actions,
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hoping that because of Japan's geographical isolation, it could
maintain an independent course in foreign affairs and profit
from the German victories in Europe.
Germany had no war obligations to Japan and remembered
with rancour her previous hesitation over a proposed military
alliance. Hitler, inflated by his victories in the summer,
and believing peace to be near with Great Britain, did not
wish to undertake any diplomatic step which might antagonize
Great Britain and force her to continue the war.
The diplomatic exchanges between the two countries,
slowed by the war in early 1940, now increased because of the
nev/ developments in Europe and in Japan.

Ambassador Ott

reported that Japan asked about the German position on French
Indo-Ghina and the Dutch East Indies.

Ott replied that Germany

had no interest in these areas as long as Japan would pledge
to keep the United States occupied in the Pacific, possibly
by an attack on the Philippines or Hawaii if the United States
15
decided to join Great Britain in the war against the Axis.
Eibbentrop met with a special Japanese envoy to discuss
their foreign policies. The Japanese government, striving for
a new order in Asia, had to stay on good terms with Russia
and to protect herself from the United States fleet in the
Pacific, Eibbentrop countered with the statement that Japan
seemed disinterested in European affairs and hinted that the
Japanese government should present a more concrete approach
15
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16
If it expected to reach some accord with Germany. Hitler's
peace offer to Great Britain in his speech on 19 July 1940
and its rejection dispelled any hopes of a short war.

The

German government, disregarding the past diplomatic failures,
renewed its efforts for a military alliance with Japan.
Germany faced the prospect of a long T?ar and one in which
United States intervention could not be ruled out in Europe.
The first signs of a rift in the German-Russian partnership
17
appeared and Hitler already spoke of an attack against Russia.
The German government believed it necessary to secure Japan to
the Axis alliance and if necessary, make concessions to achieve
this adherence.
State Secretary Weizsaecker met the Japanese ambassador,
who talked of a possible alliance and Japan's new order in
the Far East. Japan would not exclude European states, provided
they recognized Japan's leadership in the Par East and restricted
18
their activities to commercial matters. The German government
hesitated through the month of August, waiting to evaluate
the outcome of the air war over Great Britain. The reluctance
on the part of Germany to act decisively reflected the strain
of the invasion preparations and Hitler's uncertain territorial
ambitions with the conquered colonial empires of the French
13
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Republic and the Netherlands.
Eibbentrop dispatched his confidential agent, Heinrich
19
Stumer, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan at the end of
August with instructions concerning a military alliance.
Ribbentrop instructed his emissary to ascertain the actual
intentions of the Japanese government toward Germany and, if
favorable, to open negotiations in conjunction with Ott should
Japan show any inclination to conclude an agreement.

Stahmer

was to report every detail of all conversations to Ribbentrop
for approval and advice. The German special envoy arrived in
Tokyo on 7 September to conduct the negotiations.
Japan had good reason to desire an alliance with
Germany, Hitler's uncertain attitude toward the Far East upset
the Japanese plans for a new order in Asia. This reluctance
indicated that Germany might have her own plans in the Par East,
something Japan could not tolerate in view of her own economic
needs. This uncooperative attitude worried the Japanese
government but it was the policy of the United States, more
than anything else, that led to an alliance with Germany.
The agreement between the United States and Canada at Ogdensberg
to coordinate their national defense in August stressed the
solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The announcement from
London of the projected lease of British bases to the United
States in exchange for fifty destroyers made a profound
impression upon the Japanese government. It feared that the
19
Heinrich Stahmer, German diplomat, Stahmer was one of
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on other diplomatic matters in 1938.
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United States fleet might move to Singapore or Hong Kong,
bolstering Great Britain's determination to continue the war.
The Japanese government acted immediately to formulate
terms for an accord when they received the news that Ribbentrop's
special envoy would be in Tokyo, The quickly concluded
document was a fundamental agreement announcing that the three
parties, Germany, Italy and Japan, would cooperate in establishing
their respective spheres of influence in Europe and in Asia.
The Axis powers would invite Russia to join and all four
nations work together to prevent the United States from acting
outside her own hemisphere, Japan would assist her allies
with all means short of war but would reserve the right to
enter into a war against Great Britain or the United States
20
until the proper moment. Japan had three motives in these
terms:

she hoped to render Russia and the United States

inactive with a tripartite alliance, secondly she expected
to end the material support to China and finally, by
eliminating the Chinese v»'ar and neutralizing Russia and the
United States, Japan could move south to conquer those areas
left by the defeated colonial powers.
The United States grant of fifty destroyers to Great
Britain caused consternation in Berlin, Hitler realized that
Great Britain was not likely to surrender under these
circumstances. The agreement between the two nations contained
a provision for the future possibility of leases to the United
States in the Mediterranean or at strategic points close to
20
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Europe. This implied the threat of direct intervention which
Hitler wished to avoid at all costs. In order to forestall
the United States from intervention in Europe, Hitler directed
Ribbentrop to conclude an alliance with Japan. Such an
agreement would surround the United States on two sides and
might prevent her from giving material support to Great Britain.
Under these orders, Stahmer and Ott met with the
Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuoka to negotiate the terms of
an alliance. Stahmer explained Germany's position.

Germany

did not Yfant the European conflict to develop into a world war
but desired to terminate it as soon as possible.

Germany in

particular wished to avoid United States participation, which
Ribbentrop considered unlikely, but not impossible.

Ribbentrop

felt that if was more likely that the United States would
act against Japan.

Therefore an agreement between Germany and

Japan would be mutually advantageous in deterring the United
States from intervention in Europe or in the Par East. Germany
at this time did not seek military assistance from Japan
against Great Britain but only wanted Japan to help restrain
the United States.

The German government acknowledged Japanese

hegemony in the Par East and asked only for economic privileges
22
and assistance in securing strategic raw materials. Germany
requested Japan to assume a strong, determined position toward
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the United States in the hope that such a display would tend
to restrain the latter's policies and material support.
Ott, Stahmer and Matsuoka conducted the negotiations
for a draft treaty in the strictest secrecy. The three diplomats
finished their work on 11 September and Ott wired Ribbentrop
that the two parties had agreed on a draft but that there were
still some questions the Japanese government desired to have
23
clarified in secret protocols. The major difference of opinion
arose over the wording of what became article three, in which
the contracting powers defined their obligations in the event
of an outside attack.

The original Japanese draft was vague

and non-commital. Stahmer submitted a more precise counterdraft
providing that if a party to the pact was attacked by a power
not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese
conflict, the other members would resist with all possible
political, economic and military means.

Ribbentrop also

wanted the military obligations of article three to operate
when one of the three powers concerned was "either openly or
in concealed form" attacked by a power not involved in either
war. This stipulation would be directed against United
States military assistance to Great Britain.
Matsuoka strongly objected to this clause and
successfully deleted the passage. The draft treaty went to a
special meeting of the Japanese cabinet on 16 September and
Ribbentrop left for Rome on 19 September to inform Italy.
Ribbentrop made one more attempt to broaden the Japanese
23
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obligations under article three with a nev/ revision on 21
September.

This draft read that if a power not involved in

the European war or in the Far Eastern conflict "committed
acts of aggression" against one of the contracting powers,
Germany, Italy and Japan would "undertake to declare war on
such a power and to assist one another with all political,
24
economic and military means". Ribbentrop declared that this
declaration would effectively deter the United States from
entering the war if the pact stated in clear and impressive
terms that the United States would be automatically at war.
But the Japanese navy strongly opposed this definite commitment
to declare v/ar and the Germans reluctantly gave way.
The negotiators agreed on the text of the Tripartite
Pact and its secret accords on 23 September and transmitted the
25
pact to Berlin and Rome, Ribbentrop insisted that the pact be
signed in Berlin, much to Matsuoka's displeasure.

Ribbentrop

in turn agreed to the English translations of the text to
faciliate matters for the Japanese Privy Council and not delay
ratification to compare separate language texts for discrepancies.
All parties approved the text of the draft treaty and signed
the Tripartite Pact in Berlin on 27 September 1940,
The Tripartite Pact itself consisted of a preamble and
six articles. The three parties, in defense of their new
orders and in the quest of peace, recognized in articles one
24
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and two their respective spheres of interest in Europe and in
the Par East.

Article three, the military basis of the

treaty, stated:
Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts
on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one
another with all political, economic and military means if
one of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power
at present not involved in the European war or in the
Chinese-Japanese conflict. 26
To implement the pact, the respective governments would appoint
joint commissions.

The three powers also stipulated in article

five that the pact affected in no way the existing political
status between the signatories and Russia. The Tripartite Pact
27
would remain in force for ten years.
Certain additional provisions, embodied in an exchange
of letters between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ott,
contained the secret accords to the public agreement. These
represented the German concessions for the alliance with Japan.
Germany agreed that the question whether one of the parties
to the treaty had or had not been attacked would be decided by
consultation among the three parties to the treaty and Japan
would be free to choose her ov/n time to enter the war.

Germany

would render full military and economic assistance to Japan
in event of an attack while in the meantime, Germany would
give Japan all possible technical and material aid to prepare
for any military emergency. In the event of war between Japan
2S
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and Great Britain, Germany would afford all possible assistance.
Japan would keep the former German possessions in the Pacific,
Other ex-German colonies nov/ held by Japan would be returned
upon the conclusion of the European war, but Germany would agree
to sell such territories back to Japan.

Finally, Germany
28

promised to work for a detente between Japan and Russia.
The reaction to the Tripartite Pact in Japan accentuated
the divisions in the Japanese government. Foreign Minister
Matsuoka declared that the agreement would help to accomplish
the objectives of Japanese foreign policy in China and in Asia.
An offical spokesman for the Japanese government stated that
the treaty was not directed against any specific power, and
should be viewed as a mutual aid pact rather than a military
29
alliance. Others in offical circles regarded the signature of the
pact as a tremendous gamble on the part of the Japanese
government that Germany v;ould defeat Great Britain. There was
a notable lack of enthusiasm in the press for the treaty,
signifying a large measure of public disapproval.
Ribbentrop's speech at the signature of the treaty in
Berlin was the offical belligerent attitude of the German
government.

The Foreign Minister stated:

The pact now signed is a military alliance between three of
the most powerful states on earth. Above all it proposes
to bring peace to the world as soon as possible...any State
which might harbor the intention of interfering in the final
phase of the solution of these problems in Europe or in
28
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Eastern Asia, on. attacking any signatory of the three
power pact, will have to reckon with the entire massed
energy of the three nations embracing 250 million people.
This means that the Pact will, in any event serve the
restoration of peace. 30
The German press called the new alliance a serious defeat
for British diplomacy and the end to all hope for intervention
of any third parties. Hitler also voiced his pleasure about
Japan's collaboration with the Axis. The Tripartite Pact was
to be the high point in Germany's diplomatic relations
with Japan,
The reaction of the other world powers was not great.
Most felt that this coalition had been in the process of
formation for a long time and was the logical outcome of
31
Japanese foreign policy since 1931. The addition of one more
alliance to the cauldron of war for half the world did not
seem that important.
One condition of the secret accords to the Tripartite
Pact was Germany's promise to mediate the differences between
the Japanese and Russia.

Certainly one important inducement

to the Japanese government to conclude the agreement with
Germany was its expectation that the agreement would improve
Japan's relations with Russia. Ribbentrop described the pact
as the logical result of Germany's foreign policy to promote
friendly relations between Russia and Japan.

A reconciliation

30
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between Russia and Japan would allow all four powers to act
32
in concert to define their spheres of influence. Ribbentrop
33
Invited Vyacheslov llolotov, the Russian Foreign Minister, to
Berlin to discuss those issues concerning Russia, Japan and
Germany,

Molotov arrived for a two-day visit in Berlin

on 12 November 1940.
Ribbentrop expressed the German desire for an agreement
among the Axis, Russia and Japan designating their respective
spheres of interest for the four powers.

Germany possessed

only a commercial interest in the Par East with the Tripartite
Pact meant to regulate only European conditions,

Germany

wanted to conclude an agreement with Russia dividing Europe,
with Russia doing the same with Japan in the Par East.

The

four powers then could decide on a suitable partition of
the British Empire.
Molotov countered with a demand that German-Russian
cooperation would have to be settled first.

The Russian

government would agree to a four-power pact if Japan would
renounce her concessions on the island of Sakhalin, Hitler
promised a great coalition from Gibraltar to Vladivostok if
Russia would join with the Axis and Japan for harmony in
34
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Eibbentrop made one more attempt to convince Molotov
of the necessity to cooperate and to define the outlines for the
great partition of the Eastern Hemisphere.

He produced a

draft of a treaty with the signatories of the Tripartite Pact
on one hand and Russia on the other, agreeing to prevent the
extension of the v/ar, to respect their separate "natural spheres
of interest" and to join no combination against each other.
Ribbentrop told Molotov that Japan wanted a non-aggression
pact with Russia and would be quite generous, recognizing Outer
Mongolia and Sinkiang as being in the Russian sphere of influence.
Molotov replied that negotiations with Japan would be difficult
35
and laboriously complex.
The Molotov visit to Berlin was a climactic moment in
German-Russian relations and its failure ruined any expectations
of the Japanese government for a negotiated settlement through
the Tripartite Pact.

The negotiations resulted in no agreement

among the four powers and for Japan, it did nothing to solve
the China war.

Japan experienced her first disillusionment

with the Tripartite Pact and, along with the refusal of Great
Britain to surrender, it meant a sharp setback for the "Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

German mediation did not

produce a detente v/ith Russia and henceforth, Japan would
return to direct negotiations with the Russian government.
Hitler, angered by Molotov's hostile attitude, concluded that
there was but one solution to the problem.

On 18 December 1940

Hitler signed War Directive No. 21 OPERATION BARBARGSSA for
55
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the invasion of Russia in the spring of 1941

The Tripartite Pact was a political treaty for the
authoritarian new order of the Axis. It supported a policy of
worldwide intimidation directed against the United States and
Russia and a proposed division of the disintegrating British
Empire. In September 1940 a military alliance made little
sense to a victorious Germany but she feared the persistent
support of the United States to Great Britain.

Germany signed

the treaty in the hope that the addition of Japan to the
Axis alliance would force the British to negotiate for peace
and isolate the United States from intervention.
Germany and Japan were reborn soldier states opposed to
the effete western powers.

Their totalitarian governments

represented the embodiment of a new international political
order for world domination. The Tripartite Pact promoted this
political system for the mutual advantage of Germany and Japan.
The policy of worldwide intimidation focused on the
danger of the United States.

Germany gained an ally in the

Pacific to force the United States to divide her forces and to
weaken her support to Great Britain.

Japan hoped that German

mediation could secure Russian neutrality so that she might
conquer the rich colonial possessions in Southeast Asia.
The division of the British Empire would help Germany
weaken the resistance of Great Britain in Europe if Japan
would sever the vital outposts in the Par East from the home
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Islands»

Germany stood to gain immensely if Japan seized

the major military possessions in Asia.

Such actions by the

Japanese government would shift United States interest
to the Pacific.
The Tripartite Pact was the climax in Germany's
diplomatic relations with Japan. The pact was a political
accord and could not be used for military purposes because of
the geographical separation between Germany and Japan. Distance
made their collaboration impossible as did the differences
in their foreign policy goals.

Nevertheless, the pact did

represent a serious political menace and a veiled military
threat to the United States with the distinct possibility of a
two-front war. But the alliance increased the importance of
the United States without intending to do so.

Germany wanted

to gain time to defeat Great Britain before the United States
entered the v/ar.

But Hitler made the fatal decision to invade

Russia. This decision, unknown to the Japanese government,
made the Tripartite Pact in actual practice an unworkable
military alliance whose political value deteriorated as the
war expanded into a global conflict in June 1941.

CHAPTER VI
WAR

1940-JUNE 1941

The failure of the German-Russian conferences in
November 1940 placed Germany and Japan at opposite ends in
their relations with Russia in 1941.

The Japanese government

believed that Germany would be able to improve Russo-Japanese
relations but when the German-Russian entente began to
deteriorate, it refused to face reality.

Germany prepared

for a massive attack against Russia in the spring and Hitler
did not feel that it was necessary to inform his ally
of the invasion.
Germany wanted Japan to take the intiative in the Pacific
and seize the British stronghold of Singapore. Hitler hoped to
defeat Great Britain by indirect means through an attack on
Singapore.

This move would be extremely advantageous because

it would mean one more setback for the tottering British
nation and remove a major obstacle to Japan's "Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".
The German motives for a Japanese attack on Singapore
were consonant with the spirit of the recently signed Tripartite
Pact. In a naval intelligence estimate in January 1941 the
chief of Naval Operations expressed the view:
It must and can be assumed that if America's entry into the
war is provoked by steps taken by Japan, the United States
will not commit the main part of her fleet in the European
theatre... it is in our interest to encourage the Japanese
to take any initiative she considers within her power in
the Par Eastern area, as this would be most likely to keep
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American forces from the European theatre in addition to
weakening and tying down British forces.
We can accept the risk that such action by Japan might
bring about America's entry into the war on the side of
Britain, since, so far as naval warfare is concerned,
the total advantages outweigh the total disadvantages. 1
This apparent willingness to risk v/ar with the United States
was contingent on the Japanese government seizing Singapore
and threatening the United States.
Hitler and Ribbentrop labored under the illusion that
they could influence the Japanese government in its foreign
policy with the provisions of the Tripartite Pact.

Germany did

not possess the means to force the Japanese government to do
anything against its will and to depend upon Ribbentrop's
diplomatic skill was a dubious thing indeed. Japan shrev/dly
sought to profit from Germany's military efforts, to maintain
her freedom of action and to decide for herself v/hen and where
to go to war. Japan played a waiting game, promising action
but setting no date and so leaving open her policy. These
traits of Japanese diplomacy confused the German government
and did not further Germany's foreign policy in 1941.
Ribbentrop met with the new Japanese ambassador General
Oshima at Puschl on 23 February 1941 in an attempt to persuade
Japan to capture Singapore. Germany had no further military
tasks on the continent because the Axis partners were victorious;
all that remained was to convince the British government to
recognize the fact.

The main problem for the members of the

I
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Tripartite Pact was an extension of the alliance's usefulness.
Hitler wished to bring the war to a close as soon as possible.
Japan could play a decisive role if she would act at once to
annihilate Great Britain's key position in the Par East:
Singapore.

Ribbentrop stated: -

Japan in its own interest would be right to enter the
war as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be
an attack on Singapore...it must be carried out with
lightning speed and if at all possible v/ithout a
declaration of war.... 2
Ribbentrop summarized the reasons for quick action: 1. A
surprise move against Singapore meant a decisive blow against
the core of British imperialism; 2. The suddenness of the
operation would help keep the United States out of the war
since she lacked armaments to take such a risk; and

It

in Japan's own interest to secure her new order in the Par
East before a peace settlement had been agreed on.
Oshima replied that he favored such an attack on
Singapore but said such an operation would be difficult. It
would require seizure of the Malay peninsula and Japan needed
3
time to prepare. The conference ended on this pessimistic
note. Ribbentrop continued to pursue the matter with a strong
note to Ott in Tokyo, urging him to use all means to induce
4
Japan to seize Singapore.
Hitler, in the middle of his preparations for the
2
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invasion of Russia, issued War Directive No, 24 Regarding
Cooperation with Japan on 5 March to explain his position
on Japan. He stated in the directive:
It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the
Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to
take active measures in the Par East... The Barbarossa
Operation will create most favorable and military
prerequisites for this. The seizure of Singapore as the
key British possession in the Par East would mean a
decisive success for the conduct of the war of the three
Powers... The Japanese must not be given any intimation
of the Barbarossa Operation, 5
Hitler evidently thought that the Japanese might betray the
plan to Moscow as a means to obtain a non-aggression pact
with Russia. Hitler's order was part of his political strategy
with Japan against the United States.

This decision not to

inform the Japanese government was to have serious consequences
for Germany at a later date and an adverse effect in Japan.
Hitler evinced a general desire to keep the United
States out of the war in Europe. He sought to prevent diplomatic
incidents in the Atlantic and to refuse any challenge which
might lead to United States intervention.

Hitler hoped to

divert the United States to the Pacific by encouraging Japan to
act boldly in that ocean.

Germany did not want Japan to enter

into actual conflict with the United States because such a war
would soon spread to the Atlantic,

But a move against Singapore

would oblige the United States to focus her attention in the
Pacific.

Hitler shrewdly calculated that the United States

would have to take the initiative to declare war—a difficult
_
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step for a democracy. Hitler's political strategy worked for
a time to Germany's benefit but its eventual failure was due
to Hitler's inability to influence Japan.
The disappointing results of the Tripartite Pact and
the failure of Molotov's visit to Berlin prompted Foreign
Minister Matsuoka to consider a personal trip to Europe.

He

received a formal invitation from Berlin and decided to come
early in 1941.

Matsuoka's journey to Europe with visits in

Moscow and Berlin had a dual purpose.

Matsuoka wanted to learn

Germany's plans against Great Britain and if relations with
Russia were still good.

While in Moscow, Matsuoka hoped to

negotiate a non-aggression pact with Russia and to attempt to
settle the Chinese v;ar.

In each case Matsuoka was to make

no military commitments to either nation with respect to
participation in the European war.
Ribbentrop prepared extensively for this important
visit to Berlin, He would be able for the first time to speak
directly to Matsuoka in an attempt to persuade him to have
Japan attack Singapore. It also gave Ribbentrop the opportunity
to forewarn the Japanese that all was not well between Germany
and Russia and that Japan should move quickly in the south to
take advantage of the forthcoming opportunities in the north.
Ott wired Ribbentrop before the first scheduled conference
about the possibilities for a Japanese attack on Singapore.
He concluded that the Japanese were preparing such a venture
but that the attack hinged upon Japan's freedom of action
i*
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6
without fear from Russia.

Weizsaecker prepared a memorandum

on topics for discussion in Matsuoka's forthcoming conferences
with Ribbentrop, He concluded that the Japanese government
should be informed of the impending attack on Russia so as to
save it much embarrassment and not weaken the bonds of friendship
7
between Germany and Japan.
Matsuoka arrived in Berlin on 26 March with great
ceremony and spent the next week in a series of high-level
conferences with the leaders of Germany.

Hitler, in the midst

of the Yugoslavian crisis, considered the visit important
enough to have two personal discussions with Matsuoka.
Ribbentrop's first meeting with Matsuoka on 27 March
was a tedious review of the military situation in Europe and the
future value of the Tripartite Pact. Relations with Russia
at the moment 'were correct...but not very friendly'.

Germany

would not pay Russia's price for adherence to the Tripartite
Pact and her activities in the Balkans were totally unacceptable.
If Russia assumed a position that threatened Germany, Hitler
would crush her completely.
The principle enemy now was not Great Britain.

The

United States must be prevented from taking an active part in
the war and from rendering effective aid to Great Britain.
Ribbentrop stated that Hitler believed that Japan should
decide as soon as possible to take positive action against
3
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Great Britain,

A sudden attack on Singapore would be a decisive

factor to help defeat Great Britain and the speed of the
operation should keep the United States out of the war because
that country could scarcely risk sending its fleet into
8

Japanese waters in the Pacific.
Hitler met the same day with Matsuoka to reiterate
the German position in Europe and the unique opportunities
in the Par East for Japan to satisfy her colonial aspirations.
The capture of Singapore would be a major step toward the
9
establishment of Japan's new order in Asia. Ribbentrop repeated
Hitler's conversation the next day.

He stated that: "Germany

...had everything she needed...in Europe" but Japan would
have to seize Singapore in order to establish her dominance.
On Russia, Ribbentrop stated:
...that a closer collaboration with Russia was an
absolute impossibility since the ideological bases of
the army as well as the rest of the nation were
completely incompatible. 10
This was the first definite hint of the impending invasion
and Matsuoka registered surprise.
Ribbentrop pressed the issue on Russia in yet another
conference with Matsuoka.

He stated that:

"if Russia should

ever attack Japan, Germany would strike immediately" and gave
al firm assurance that Japan could move southward towards
8
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Singapore without fear of any complications from Russia.
Ribbentrop cautioned Matsuoka against signing a conclusive
agreement with Russia but to conduct negotiations on a
11
superficial level. Stalin's price for joining the Tripartite
Pact was too high for Germany to consider and Ribbentrop
told Matsuoka that the British fleet, involved in the Atlantic
and in the Mediterranean, could not interfere with a Japanese
assault on Singapore.

Matsuoka travelled to Rome to confer with Mussolini
and the Pope and then returned to Berlin on 4 April. In his
final conferences with Hitler and Ribbentrop there were few
things that remained to be said. Hitler stated that he wanted
to prevent the United States from entering the conflict and had
taken steps against a possible invasion of Europe.

He went

on to declare that:
If Japan got into a conflict with the United States,
Germany on her part would take the necessary steps at
once... Germany...would promptly take part in case of
a conflict between Japan and the United States for the
strengh ..of the Axis in the Three Power Pact lay in their
acting in common. Their weakness would be allowing
themselves to be defeated separately. 12
Matsuoka returned the assurance with the statement that a war
against the United States appeared unavoidable but made no
definite promise to Hitler to join Germany if she became
involved in a conflict with the United States.

Matsuoka

departed from Berlin and journeyed to Moscow,
11
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Matsuoka signed a treaty of neutrality With Stalin
while in Moscow on 1^ April.

Matsuoka, from his talks in

Berlin, realized that Germany did not intend to invade Great
Britain and that German-Russian relations were not good.
Therefore Japan would have to depend on her own resources.
Japan looked south and was anxious for a treaty v/ith Russia to
safeguard herself in the north.

The Russian government attempted

to negate the possibilities of a two-front war if relations
with Germany deteriorated any further.

The stipulation of

mutual neutrality in times of war provided Russia with a
measure of security in the east to meet the imminent crisis
in the west.
Hitler regarded the Russo-Japanese neutrality treaty
with a mixture of perplexity and indifference.

At a naval

conference on 20 April Hitler stated that the agreement had
15
been concluded with Germany's approval. But many officals
in the higher echelons of the German government realized that
Matsuoka's action in Moscow annoyed Hitler.

Riboentrop stated

that he had not given his approval of such a treaty to Matsuoka
14
and the conclusion of the accord was a complete surprise.
Hitler's basic attitude v/as one of indifference because the
agreement tended to camouflage his future action against
Russia. However, Hitler underestimated the value of the
understanding for Japan. The Japanese government maintained
_
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its independence in foreign policy which would have serious
repercussions for Germany.
Japan's independent foreign policy did not take long
to make itself known when, on 4 May, Matsuoka informed
Ribbentrop that Japan had begun to negotiate with the United
States in an effort to mediate the differences between the two
nations in the Pacific and the recent embargoes upon Japan by
the United States.

The conferences began through regular

diplomatic channels in early 1941 without the knowledge of
the German government.
Ribbentrop v/as furious when he heard the news.

Ott

wired Berlin that influences hostile to the Tripartite Pact
compelled Matsuoka to yield. In a conversation with him,
Matsuoka stated that:
If war should break out between Germany and Russia, no
Japanese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister would be
able to keep Japan neutral. In such a case Japan would
be impelled by natural consideration to join Germany
in attacking Russia, 15
Ribbentrop showed Oshima a report of the Japanese-American
talks and took the position that if Japan should conclude an
agreement with the United States, it would render the Tripartite
Pact meaningless, no matter what phraseology might be used
in an attempt to reconcile the act.

Ribbentrop expressed his

desire that Japan would not sign a non-aggression pact with
the United States.

But Hitler differed with Ribbentrop on

this point and was ready to see the conversations continue,
15
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provided that they served to deter the United States from
16
affording assistance to Great Britain. Hitler's pledge to go
to v/ar against the United States if she attacked Japan was no
doubt meant to stimulate Tokyo into action against Singapore,
Germany could give Japan little support except through submarine
warfare and Hitler concluded that if the Japanese government
continued to negotiate with the United States, it would relieve
the pressure on Germany.

The German invasion of Russia would

settle Japan's uneasiness in the north and thereby create a
I

much stronger threat to the United States when Japan actively
intervened in Asia.
Ribbentrop drafted a strong note to the Japanese
government. In it he reminded Matsuoka that the Tripartite
Pact was to ,prevent othei* powers from intervening in the war.
In order to avoid weakening the agreement, its members should
not make special agreements outside the pact, or at any rate,
fail to insure recognition of the critical stipulation of the
pact. The German government demanded that it be permitted to
17
participate fully in the Japanese-American negotiations. This
burst of temper did not ruffle the Japanese government and
Matsuoka assured Berlin of Japan's loyalty to the Tripartite
Pact.

Ribbentrop, deeply discontented and confused, still
i

felt that Japan would honor her obligations.
German preparations continued for the invasion of Russia
TB
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and still Ribbentrop did not inform Japan of the operation,
Ott asked Ribbentrop if he could inform Matsuoka about the
impending invasion to warn the Japanese government and perhaps
18
coordinate it with military action by Japan in the Par East.
Ribbentrop did not wish to contradict Hitler's directive and
instead speculated that the German attack on Russia might cause
Japan to halt her advance to the south and join with Hitler
19
in dispensing of her traditional enemy Russia. Weizsaecker
asked Oshima if Matsuoka Understood the true state of affairs
between Germany and Russia.

Oshima replied that he did not

believe Matsuoka suspected the deep hostility between the two
and appeared genuinely shocked at the suggestion.

There was

still no German initiative to inform Japan of the impending
invasion of Russia.
Matsuoka, unaware of the invasion, explained Japan's
position in the Par East to Ott on 21 June. He made no secret
of Japan's intention to seize Indo-China and to capture the
Dutch East Indies. Japan needed the valuable economic resources
in those islands, especially oil,

Matsuoka requested German

assistance to get the Vichy government of France to consent
20
to Japanese naval bases in Indo-China. Japan appeared to be
poised by mid-June to diplomatically secure a foothold in
Indo-China and then aggressively move south against the
18
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British Empire.
Hitler was never so near to complete victory as in
May and June 1941 because of Germany's success in the Balkans
and the apparent possibility of closing the Mediterranean to
Great Britain. He accomplished all this before the United
States could enter the war and had his ally Japan in the
Pacific to threaten the United States and delay intervention*
Hitler now only had the problem of Russia.
to stake everything on a German victory.

Here he determined

The conquest of

Russia would provide Germany with the economic resources for
the final assault in the west.

In Europe, the invasion of

Russia provided only a temporary respite to Great Britain.
But in the Par East, it gave the final impetus to Japan's plans
for expansion that was to lead to v/ar with the United States.
Hitler presented his ally Japan with a fait accompli
on 22 June 1941 when the German army invaded Russia.

The

deliberate policy of not informing Japan of the German plans
resounded with shocking effect in Tokyo. Prime Minister
Konoye regarded the action as a betrayal of the Tripartite
Pact and favored an immediate withdrawal from the accord.
The attack made nonsense of one of the reasons for Japan's
adherence to the pact—a settlement with Russia.

The Japanese

government concluded that Russia would not be easily defeated
and that Hitler had involved Germany in a long, exhausting
war. Such circumstances meant that Japan would nov; face a
coalition of the United States, Russia and Great Britain.
prospect for the expected German defeat of Great Britain

The
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faded into the background,
Germany attempted to soothe Japan with a torrent of
diplomatic notes all designed to calm her ally and to keep her
within the Tripartite Pact. Ott explained to Matsuoka the
reasons for the German attack on Russia.

Matsuoka in turn

stated that according to his reports from Berlin, Hitler did
21
not expect active participation by Japan against Russia.
Contrary to this assumption Ribbentrop pushed for immediate
military action by Japan against Russia in a discussion with
Oshima.

He listed seven reasons for Japanese intervention:

1. It would provide a direct land connection between the two
countries; 2. The war would provide a solution to the Russian
problem; 3,It would make possible a new order in Europe; 4. Japan
in turn could create her own new order; 5. Rather than drive
south to Singapore, she could move north and then free her
rear for the south; 6, A decision should be made without
hesitation; and 7. A swift defeat of Russia would keep the
United States out of the war, Ribbentrop instructed Ott to
use all his influence and these arguments to persuade the
22
Japanese to intervene. Another note, written in the excited
optimism of the first massive German victories, urged Japan
to intervene quickly because Russian military resistance
23
might collapse sooner than expected.
21
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The Japanese government listened to these bombastic
overtures to war with strong restraint and a growing distrust
of Germany, Japan could not be lured into a war with the
promises of a quick victory over Russia.

Matsuoka informed the

Russian ambassador in early July that Japan would honor fully
her neutrality agreement with Russia. The course of GermanJapanese relations continued to run true to past form:

each

party attempting to exploit the other and consulting the other
only when in its own interest.

CHAPTER VII
DECISION TO DEFEAT

JUNE 1941-DECEMBER 1941

Germany's relations with Japan after the invasion of
Russia in June 1941 underwent a reversal of policy, appearing
inconsistent to the Japanese government,

Ribbentrop's arguments

that Russia had been defeated and then his request for Japanese
assistance against Russia seemed surprising at such an early
date in the war.

The Japanese asked themselves, if the German

government wanted to benefit from Japan's cooperation, why did
Hitler refuse to inform Japan properly and fail to plan joint
strategy in advance?

No doubt suspicion, and the desire for

secrecy and surprise were part of the answer and also Hitler's
confidence in Germany's capacity to defeat Russia alone.

German

diplomats advised Japan to occupy Singapore but when the
Japanese government did not drive south and instead began to
negotiate with the United States, Hitler considered intervention
by Japan in the war against Russia as the best alternative.
Ribbentrop sent a strong note to the Japanese government
on 1 July urging it to intervene in the war to seize Vladivostok
and to advance west so that the defeat of Russia would free
both Europe and the Par East from her menace:
The impending collapse of the Russians' main military power
and thereby presumably of the Bolshevist regime itself,
offers Japan the unique opportunity to free herself also
from the Russian threat and give the Japanese empire the
security in the north which is a necessary condition
for its vitally important expansion in the south. It
therefore seems to me that the need of the hour is for the
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Japanese army to seize Vladivostok as soon as possible
and...meet the German troops advancing to the east halfway
...before the cold season sets in...and finally to have
the whole Russian question settled,..jointly in such a
way as to eliminate for all time the Russian threat
to both Germany and Japan. 1
Ribbentrop went on to state that the defeat of Russia would;
"suffice to paralyze any tendency toward intervention in the
war (by) the United States (and) hasten the defeat of England
2
by the Axis powers." Ribbentrop with his faulty logic believed
that Japan's intervention would solve all of Germany's world
problems.

What he failed to see was that German influence

in Tokyo fell far short of such a task.

Ribbentrop not only

overestimated German influence in Japanese affairs but he also
miscalculated Japan's military strength.

Hitler recognized

the Japanese puppet regime in China as the legitimate government
3
of China in an attempt, to obtain Japan's military support.
All these major policy changes came within the space of ten
days for German foreign policy.
The sudden shift in German foreign policy confused the
Japanese government and necessitated a change in its policies.
Japan did not have sufficient troops available for simultaneous
assaults against Vladivostok and Singapore and the Japanese
army feared the strong Russian forces in the north. The army
had high hopes that Germany soon would crush Russia and then
Japan would have no need to go to war.

Matsuoka alone advocated
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an offensive against Russia for political, ideological and
strategic reasons but the military leaders still favored a

4
southward advance based on the hard facts of economic necessity,
Ott reported from Tokyo that Matsuoka stated that
Japan was not at present in a position to enter the war against
5
Russia but was preparing for all eventual possibilities. The
Japanese government instead decided to secure points'appui in
French Indo-China in order to increase its pressure on Great
Britain and the United States. Japan reasoned that such a
contribution to the common cause would be no less important

6
than Japanese intervention against Russia. Ribbentrop certainly
misjudged Japan's intentions when he believed that she would
attack Russia.

The Japanese-American conversations presented

a more disconcerting problem to the German government.
Ribbentrop distrusted Japan's motives for the talks
and this apprehension grew when the United States occupied
Iceland on 10 July.

He asked Ott for more details on the

Japanese-American negotiations and the possibility of an oral
accord between the two countries. Ribbentrop doubted if the
United States occupied Iceland without Japan's consent.

He also

cast serious aspersions on the report of a deadlock in the
7
negotiations between Japan and the United States. Ott reported
4
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strained relations between the two countries because of the
United States economic blockade.

The Japanese government

regarded an United States entry into the war with great
anxiety.

Ott tried his upmost to have Japan declare
8
war against Russia.
Hitler had a talk with Oshima at his field headquarters

in the east on 15 July.

He spoke at length on the campaign

9
against Russia and urged that Japan join to annihilate Russia.

Germany's efforts suffered a severe setback when on 16 July
the Konoye government resigned and Germany lost its strongest
supporter in that government, Foreign Minister Matsuoka.
i

The new Japanese government implied no change in

Japan's policy toward Russia and promised to uphold the
10
Tripartite Pact. Ott expressed the opinion that the new
government would not pursue a vigorous policy against the
11
United States, or Russia, But the German government deluded
itself to the point where it believed that Japan's entry into
the Russian v/ar to be only a matter of time,

Ribbentrop

continued his efforts to convince Japan to cease negotiations
with the United States,

The embargo by the United States on

aviation gas and oil to Japan placed the Japanese government
8
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in a great dilemma and generated greater misgivings in Japan
12
about an^early v/ar with Russia, These reports still did not
convince the German Foreign Office that Japan had no interest
in a war against Russia,
Hitler's thought Japan's intervention imminent and in
a naval conference on 22 August stated: "Japan would carryout the attack on Vladivostok as soon as forces have been
13
assembled,..and the attack is to come as a surprise move."
Hitler's prediction conflicted with a report two days later
from the German naval attach/ in Tokyo. He stated that, based
on conversations with leading Japanese naval officers on
22 August, there would be no attack on Russia. Japan instead,
after consolidating her bases in Indo-China, would occupy
Thailand and- the Dutch oil fields, attack Manilla and blockade
14
Singapore. Ribbentrop responded to this news with a hysterical
telegram in which he called Japan's attitude incomprehensible
and outlined several arguments with which Ott was to counter
15
the irresolution of the new Japanese government,
Japan continued to follow her own independent course
in foreign policy, antagonizing Germany and creating a serious
breach in the German-Japanese alliance.

The Japanese Prime

12
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Minister suggested a personal conference with the President
of the United States to discuss the difficulties between the

16
two nations,

Ott asked if there was a change in Japan's

policy but the Japanese Foreign Office informed him that this
was not the case,

Japan was still loyal to the Tripartite
17
Pact and would assume no commitment contrary to the pact.
These serious divergences in the alliance forced Germany to
make a renewed attempt to bring Japan closer to her side.
Ribbentrop directed Ott to urge that Japan inform the United
States that further acts of aggression would invoke the
casus belli in the Tripartite Pact and that she would exercise
18
caution in dealing with the United States.
The Japanese government assured Germany on 16 September
that Japan would come to the aid of the Axis in case of an
attack by the United States on them and repeated that Japan
in accordance with the Tripartite Pact had fullfilled her
19
task of restraining the United States from entering the v/ar.
Ott considered such statements to be far from precise and
unimpressive. But regardless of Germany's objections, Japan
continued to negotiate with the United States. The negotiations
did not solve the problems and as the month of September drew
16
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to a close, the chances for peace or war began to gravitate
toward the latter.
i

Germany had its first intimation of this nev/ course
tov/ard war in a report from Ott of Japan's position as sketched
by high officers of the Japanese army. The generals preferred
an attack in the south against the British Empire which would
not be dependent on weather as would operations against Russia,
Great Britain was the immediate enemy but there was a growing
20
feeling that war with the United States was inevitable. The
German Foreign Office emphasized its dissatisfaction with
strong denunciations to Oshima of the continued negotiations
with the United States,

At the same time it was also aware

that these negotiations were fast approaching a complete
deadlock.

The Japanese government fell on 16 October and a
21
new government under General Hedeki Tojo assumed power. The
choice of the general was not illogical in view of the army's

determination to attack the United States should negotiations
fail. The German government did not consider the consequences
of a failure in the talks, a costly mistake.
The advent of the Tojo government in October 1941
actually worried Hitler. He feared that Japan might declare
war against Russia and so be in Germany's way were Russia
suddenly to collapse, as she appeared to be doing at this
22
stage of the invasion. However this was not the case as the
20
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Tojo government showed a decided lack of enthusiasm for
intervention,

Ott confirmed this position in a talk with

the new Foreign Minister Togo. He stated that there was no
decision yet about the United States or Russia and that foreign
23
policy was still uncertain. To30 was much more hostile to the
United States than his immediate predecessor and Ott learned
that there were definite limits on Japan's conversations with
24
the United States beyond which she would not go.
Japanese-American relations deteriorated rapidly through
I

November and Japan approached the decision on war.

The German

government, not fully cognizant of this course, continued to
be vociferous in its call for an end to the negotiations.

The

two nations renewed the original 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact with
one important modification:
between Germany and Japan.

the abolition of the secret protocol
The German-Russian war, the

Japanese-Russian neutrality treaty and the Tripartite Pact
made this change a logical one.
The Japanese government faced a serious crisis with the
possibility of a Japanese-American war becoming more definite
and the question:

would Germany prove faithful to its promises?

A strict interpretation of the Tripartite Pact made no provision
for assistance if Japan initiated an attack.

There was

considerable doubt in the Japanese government and a fear that
Germany might conclude a separate peace.
23
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Conference on 5 November, the Japanese government formulated
its policy.

Japan decided to inform Germany and Italy without

delay of her intention to initiate hostilities when
negotiations with thé United States deadlocked and war became
irreconcilable, as was expected after 25 November. In the
spirit of the Tripartite Pact, Japan would begin conversations
with her Axis partners for their entry into the war and the
conclusion of a "no separate peace" agreement,

Japan intended

to refuse a German demand to enter the war against Russia,
25
even it meant a delay in German participation,
A member of the Japanese General Staff approached
the German military attache in Tokyo on 20 November and asked
whether Germany would support Japan with military forces should
a conflict arise between Japan and the United States.

Ott

passed the question on to Ribbentrop in Berlin. Ribbentrop
replied that Germany considered it a matter of policy that
in case either Germany or Japan became involved in a war with
the United States, they would conclude a peace or armistice
jointly and that Germany:

"would be entirely inclined to lay
26
down the necessary stipulations in an agreement..." The
Japanese government, highly gratified with Germany's response,
pressed the matter further.

The Japanese Minister of War

asked Ott if Germany would also consider herself at war with
25
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the United States if Japan should open hostilities against
27
the latter. The German Foreign Office made no reply to this
request for a direct commitment.
Ribbentrop met with Oshima on 28 November to discuss
Japanese-American relations. Ribbentrop commented that he
did not believe that Japan could avoid a showdown with the
United States and that the situation hardly could be more
favorable for a war now.
of the Tripartite Pact.

A war would realize the full potential
Germany would join with Japan at once

and sign a "no separate peace" agreement.

Ribbentrop stated

at the end of the conversation:
Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United
States, Germany of course v/ould join the war immediately.
There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering
into a separate peace with the United States under such
circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point. 28
Japan did not want to attack Russia too, but at this stage
any Japanese expansion of the war was welcome to the German
government.

Germany had no suspicions that Japan intended to

attack the United States, Hitler believed that Japan would
attack the British and the Dutch possessions in the Par East,
exactly what he wanted Japan to do.

He felt that a pledge to

support Japan if the United States was to intervene would give
her the courage to strike.

If Hitler had knov/n in advance what

Japan was going to do, he might have avoided giving his
27
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"blank check" of support. But at this date Hitler believed
that he had decisively beaten Russia.
Japan made the final decision to attack the United
States on 1 December and immediately set in motion diplomatic
efforts to secure the participation of the Axis in the coming
war with a special agreement. Tojo instructed Oshima to tell
Hitler and Ribbentrop that Great Britain and the United States,
in a provocative manner, made military movements that Japan,
for her security, could not tolerate.

Oshima was to say very

secretly to them that there was extreme danger that war suddenly
might break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan
through some clash of arms and to add that the time of the
29
outbreak of the war might come sooner than anyone dreamed.
Germany's response appeared to be in some doubt and
Ribbentrop was extremely cautious. He replied to Oshima's
request for an agreement with much hestitancy, pointing out
that Germany was being asked to make an extremely grave decision
without adequate information.

Ribbentrop considered that

Germany was not obligated to assist Japan in case she attacked
the United States but Hitler dismissed these considerations
50
as unimportant. On 5 December Ribbentrop told Oshima that
Hitler accepted Japan's request and also gave him a draft of
the proposed treaty.

The draft provided that should a state

of war arise between Japan and the United States, Germany and
PHA, vol. XII, pp. 204-205.
50
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Italy would also enter the war and wage it v/ith all the armed
forces at their disposal. Japan would do the same should war
break ouf between the Axis and the United States. The three
powers would not conclude peace without full previous agreement
among themselves with the same stipulation applying in event
of war between Japan and Great Britain. The agreement was to
51
have the same duration as the Tripartite Pact of 1940, The
draft showed that Germany had no idea that war between Japan
and the United States v/as imminent.

Tojo warned Oshima that

war might come before the agreement could be signed and he
32
considered a simple "no separate peace" accord to be the best.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December
stunned the German government.

No one suspected the attack.

Ribbentrop later said;
I tried to induce Japan, at the time, to attack Singapore.
I also tried to make Japan attack Russia. She did neither
of the things we v/anted her to do, but instead.,.she
attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, 55
Ribbentrop, after hearing the news of the attack, questioned
Oshima and told him that Germany and Italy would immediately
support Japan.

The attack on Pearl Harbor also made the
54
draft treaty obsolete. Hitler, despite his earlier desire to
avoid a conflict with the United States, was not only surprised
but delighted by Japan's successful intervention. Hitler
51
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considered Japan's entry into the war among the most decisive
35
events in modern history. Japan's action provided psychological
support for the German army which was just then undergoing
serious reverses on the Russian front.

On 5 December Ott

i

warned the Japanese government against attacking the United
36
States outright. But he received a sharp directive from Berlin
to correct this wrong impression^

So long as Japan joined

37
the war the form was not important anymore, cabled Ribbentrop.
This attitude was not surprising. Since September Germany
had, for all intents and purposes been at war with the United
States in the Atlantic,
A day after Pearl Harbor, Oshima submitted a formal
request that Germany declare war on the United States.
Ribbentrop told him that Hitler already had given orders to the
German navy to attack United States shipping. He was in
conference with his staff at General Headquarters to decide
how a formal declaration of war could be v/ritten so as to
38
make a good impression on the German people. Many thought
that Hitler would avoid the request because of the previous
shrewd policy of avoiding incidents in the Atlantic.

But this

approach was nov; impossible. Hitler's stand in the Atlantic
35
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was no longer practical since the United States now escorted
convoys with orders to shoot on sight from President Roosevelt.
If the Germans avoided an outright declaration of war, the
United States' focus of attention would shift to the Pacific
and allow Germany much needed respite.

However, clever

diplomacy found itself pitted against totalitarian arrogance
and Hitler's prestige.

The logic of the situation did not
39
allow Hitler to renege on his pledge. Ribbentrop drafted a
revised tripartite agreement providing that the Axis would
fight until victory was secured, that they would make no
separate armistice or peace without full agreement of each
partner and that, after the v;ar, they would collaborate closely
40
in the establishment of an equitable new order.
Hitler, speaking in his most vituperative fashion
before the Reichstag, declared war on the United States on
11 December 1941. He revealed in his speech that a political
accord, signed that day also by the Axis and Japan, meant war
against Great Britain and the United States but significantly
I

omitted Russia. Germany and Japan now united in a brotherhood
of arms for the logical climax of their coalition.

Hitler's

declaration of war relieved Roosevelt of the problem of being
openly at war with Japan but still not formally at war
with Germany and Italy.

^

Germany's relations with Japan after Pearl Harbor
became a mirage in international relations. Henceforth strategy
39
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40
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rather than diplomacy would govern their relations but for
the rest of the war, common planning was conspicuous by its
absence and the various military agreements only so much
paper.

The vast geographical distance between Germany and

Japan and the difficulties in communications contributed to
this situation. But the peculiar nature of the totalitarian
' regimes of Germany and Japan did not allow any collaboration
as neither ally could or would provide military assistance
for the other. Under these circumstances, Hitler's declaration
of war was as great a blunder as Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor,
I

I

The efficacy of the Tripartite Pact hinged on the
fact that neither Germany nor Japan proved willing to make
sacrifices for the sake of the alliance, a point inherent
in this opportunistic association. Their mutual efforts were
against the status quo and the destruction of the established
order.

In the Tripartite Pact, each ally established the

territorial domain of its new order and warned others against
interference.

Therefore, if one ally considered its aims

to be realized it cared little for the other.

This was why

Hitler had no use for the Japanese after the fall of Prance
and why in 1942 Japan showed little concern about Germany.
Two more factors, distrust and the mutual desire to
draw an advantage from the other, characterized the Tripartite
Pact.

The events of 22 June and 7 December demonstrated the

suspicion harbored by Germany and Japan toward each other, an
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attitude so distrustful that each preferred to forego mutual
strategy for the sake of secrecy.

Both allies showed great

propensity for wishing the other to carry the burden of the
war.

Germany wanted Japan to assault Singapore and later

Vladivostok as an effective contribution to the war,

Japan

did not have the slightest intention of doing those things
unless Germany staged a successful invasion of Great Britain
or Russia collapsed politically. Hitler could not imagine that
this would be Japan's attitude.
Germany and Japan professed a single aim on the question
of the United States but again, they could not coordinate
their policies.

Both wanted to keep the United States out

of the European and the Far Eastern struggles but this policy
failed when the United States refused to be intimidated by the
Tripartite Pact. Hitler evolved a new approach to divert
United States* attention to the Pacific.

He ordered the German

navy to avoid all incidents in the Atlantic and meanwhile,
urged the Japanese government to attack Singapore and to
assume a forceful attitude toward the United States.

Hitler

believed that if the United States became involved in the
Par East, she would be less inclined to interfere in Europe
or render assistance to Great Britain. But this attempt to
use Japan failed because German influence in Tokyo was strictly
limited. Japan, after the first failures of the Tripartite
Pact, decided to reshape her policy toward the United States.
If the pact could not keep the United States out of the war,
perhaps diplomatic negotiations with her would be able to solve
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Japan's problemso

Certainly Japan was neither capable nor

willing to conduct the dangerous policy of constantly inciting
the United States as Hitler wanted Japan to do.
Hitler faced a serious dilemma when Japan began to
negotiate with the United States.

He staunchly opposed the

negotiations because they offered the United States immediate
relief in the Pacific.

As a consequence, the United States

could assume a more militant belligerency in the Atlantic.
A Japanese accord with the United States would mean Japan's
worth as an ally to be nil.

Therefore the only alternative

lay in the failure of the negotiations.

But this in turn

might initiate a war between Japan and the United States, which
Hitler had better approve if he did not wish to lose Japan
altogether, , The war v/ould spread to the Atlantic, and to
prefer it to an agreement would indicate to the Japanese
government how insincere Hitler was in his desire to prevent
United States' intervention. There was a conflict between
Hitler's Atlantic and Pacific policies—a conflict which
eventually tended to blur his thinking.

In his anxiety to

retain Japanese support, Hitler became less cautious and urged
Japan to follow a more belligerent line toward the United
States. The United States policy in the Atlantic after
September 1941 with the sink on sight orders placed Germany
and the United States at war for all practical purposes and
strengthened Hitler's tendency to take chances.

Germany's

policy toward the United States experienced a complete reversal
within a year from cautious neutrality to outright belligerency
and war.
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Japan viewed her role in the Tripartite Pact quite
differently.

When Germany wanted Japan to attack Singapore,

the Japanese government expressed fear of Russia and the United
States. Japan pleaded prior commitments in southeast Asia
when Germany urged her to take Vladivostok, The Japanese
wanted to establish their "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere" and neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop could divert them
from their course. Japan wanted to acquire the European
colonies in Asia and even hoped to settle her disputes with
the United States,

^^en this proved impossible the Japanese

government decided to proceed with its expansionist policies
at the risk of war with the United States. Ribbentrop tried
his utmost to involve Japan but he exercised little influence
and understood less about Japan's plans,

Germany's part in

the Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was extremely small
and directly, Germany bore no responsibility,

Japan made

her decision without any consideration of Germany's interests.
In fact, the Japanese decision to move south relieved Russia
on her eastern border and allowed her to move a quarter of a
million troops west to strengthen the defense of Moscow,
eventually halting the German offensive in December 1941.
During the rest of the war military cooperation of every kind
was lacking and each nation went its ovm way.

The value of

the Tripartite Pact was reduced to the paper it was written on.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

The German declaration of war against the United States
was a high point in the German-Japanese entente and also
marked the beginning of its decline. The political association
whose principle purpose had been to cause unrest and create
discord among the major world powers would henceforth be the
subject of massive attack until its destruction.

While the

Allies sought to coordinate their strategy, no real collaboration
existed between Germany and Japan. They did conclude a
military agreement in January 1942 whose provisions seemed
rather to delimit the areas of combat for each nation than to
prescribe joint action.

After having established their private

spheres of influence, neither Germany nor Japan could see the
necessity to aid one another in defense of their interests.
Hitler assumed complete control in directing the war in 1942
and it was inconceivable that he would be willing to plan
a joint military campaign.

He might persuade the Japanese

government to attack Singapore because it was in Germany's
interest but Hitler proved unwilling to reveal his plans
on Russia in order to profit from possible Japanese collaboration.
The enormous distance between Germany and Japan
seriously hampered collective action along with adequate
communications.

All regular land and sea routes closed to

Germany after the attacks on Russia and Pearl Harbor.
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The only
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opportunity for political contacts was the radio but this
was limited.

Germany's use of blockade runners, auxiliary

cruisers 'and submarines to escape Allied control of the sea
was none too successful.

Germany could neither deliver military

equipment to Japan nor obtain vital raw materials from the
Japanese Empire because of the difficulties in commercial
intercourse during the war.
In an area where Germany and Japan would really have
been able to coordinate their strategy—the Russian theatre—the
two faced different circumstances inasmuch as Japan was not
at war v/ith Russia. Japan attempted to negotiate a GermanRussian reconciliation with proposals for a mediated peace
after 1941. Japan argued that Germany faced disaster in the
struggle with Russia.

Hitler would not listen to such pleas

and wanted to destroy Russia, especially after his first
military defeats. Japan had little inclination to join in
the war against Russia and this position only provided additional
difficulties for the none too stable coalition.
The coalition between Germany and Japan was one of
negative attitudes rather than positive formulas.

Germany's

reaction to Japan's successes after Pearl Harbor was a renewed
fear of the "Yellow Peril" with the fear that all of Asia
1
might be lost to the yellow race. The "have-not" states,
Germany and Japan, in their quick assent to great power status,
wanted to create nev; orders to receive a better share of the
world's wealth.

Germany and Japan fought on separate fronts
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with the same objective but did not cooperate in military
strategy.

The aggressive nature of the association offered

strategic opportunities to each member at different times.
Japan used these opportunities advantageously threatening the
European colonies. In times of peace, this coalition held a
distinct advantage over its opponents and extended the political
influence of Germany tremendously.

The relationship was not

a perfect one v/hen Japan for instance, chose to destroy the
German commercial position in China and Germany was unable
to prevent it.
The strength of Berlin and Tokyo in peace became its
wealmess during the war. The Axis partners, widely separately,
could not cooperate effectively in any military efforts with
their forces stretched all over their respective spheres.

The

Japanese connection then started to operate against Germany's
interests.

Germany, being the more powerful of the two nations,

represented a greater danger and because of this, the Allied
strategists decided to defeat Germany first while holding
Japan in check. When the United States entered the war, Germany
and Japan were already so deeply engaged that they were
incapable or unwilling to assist each other.

The German-

Japanese alliance had split of its ovm. accord.
Germany's foreign policy toward Japan had sound political
considerations but the German Foreign Office could never
quite achieve the definite commitment to make the alliance
effective.

The Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact

fell short of the concrete military obligations that Germany
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so desperately needed to carry out her international policy
of territorial expansion.

Without firm commitments, Germany

could get Japan to do little with effective military assistance
and when Japan did act, the blow fell on the wrong adversary.
German diplomacy under Ribbentrop's direction was simply
not strong enough to bring Japan to terms. Hitler and Ribbentrop
misunderstood Japan's ovm political considerations in the
Far East and could not or would not comprehend that Japanese
foreign policy was motivated by causes different from
Germany's interests.
Germany's decision to settle for less in the way of
military obligations from Japan provided no basis for Axis
solidarity, collaboration and strategy.

Germany struck some

bad bargains with Japan because those in charge could not see
beyond Germany's own self-interests. The alliance in peace
was successful but to rely upon the good faith of the Japanese
government to act in concert with Germany was a costly mistake.
Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan were not a complete
failure.

Germany did manage to accomplish some significant

successes to meet German peacetime needs.

But Germany failed

to achieve a definite military alliance with Japan and this
failure enabled the Allies to accomplish their global strategy
and defeat Germany.

APPENDIX A
THE GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AGAINST
THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL 1

I
The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese
Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist
International kno\m as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and
subdue existing States by all means at its command; convinced
that the toleration of interference by the Communist International
in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers
their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a
menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the
defence against Communist subversion; have agreed as follows
Article I
The High Contracting Parties agree to inform one another of
the activities of the Communist International, to consult with
one another on the necessary preventive measures and to carry
these through in close collaboration.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States
whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities
of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the
spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.
Article III
The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement
is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the
day of the signature and shall remain in force for a period of
five years. Before the expiry of this period the High
Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the
further methods of their cooperation.
In witness whereof,
Berlin, November 25, 1936
vonRibbentrop
Kushakoji

1
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II
SUPPLMMTARY PROTOCOL
On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against
the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
have agreed as follows:
A) The competent authories of the two High Contracting
States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning
the exchange of information over the activities of the Communist
International as well as investigatory and defensive measures
against the Communist International.
B) The competent authories of the two High Contracting
States will within the framework of the existing laws take
severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged
directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist
International or promote its subversive activities.
C) In order to facilitate the cooperation of the competent
authorities provided for in paragraph (A) a permanent committee
will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures
necessary for the struggle against the subversive activities
of the Communist International will be considered and discussed.
III
TEXT OP THE SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE
GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT 1
The Government of the Third Reich and the Imperial Japanese
Government, recognizing that the Government of the U.S.S.R.
is working toward a realization of the aims of the Communist
International and intends to employ its army for this purpose;
convinced that this fact threatens not only the existence of
the High Contracting States, but endangers world peace most
seriously; in order to safeguard their common interests have
agreed as follows:
Article I
Should one of the High Contracting States become the object
of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by the U.S.S.R.,
the other High Contracting States obligates itself to take no
measures which would tend to ease the situation of the U.S.S.R.
Should the case described in paragraph I occur, the High
Contracting States will immediately consult on what measures
to take to safeguard their common interests.
Article II
For the duration of the present agreement the High Contracting
States will conclude no political treaties with the U.S.S.R.

1
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contrary to the spirit of this agreement without mutual consent.
Article III
The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement
is to be deemed the original text. The agreement comes into
force simultaneously with the agreement against the Communist
International signed today and will remain in force for the
same period.
In witness whereof,
Berlin, November 25, 1936.
vonRibbentrop
Mushakoji

APPENDIX B
THE THREE-POWER PACT BETWEEN GERMANY,
ITALY AND JAPAN 1

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider it the
prequisite of a lasting peace that every nation in the world
shall receive the space which it is entitled. They have,
therefore decided to stand by and cooperate with one another
in their efforts in Greater Asia and the regions of Europe
respectively. In doing this it is their prime purpose to
establish and maintain a nev; order of things, calculated to
promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples
concerned.
It is, furthermore, the desire of the three governments
to extend cooperation to nations in other spheres of the world
who are inclined to direct their efforts along lines similar
to their own for the purpose of realizing their ultimate
object, world peace.
Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and
Japan have agreed as follows:
Article I
Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and
Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.
Article II
Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of
Japan in the establishment of a nev/ order in Greater East Asia.
Article III
Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts
on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one
another with all political, economic and military means if one
of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at
present not involved in the European War or in the ChineseJapanese conflict.
Article IV
With the view of implementing the present pact, joint technical
commissions, to be appointed by the respective Governments
of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay.
Article V
Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the above agreement

I
Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1940-1941 (Boston:
World Peace Foundation, 1941;, pp. 304-305.
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affects in no way the political status existing at present
between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

*

Article
VI
I

The present pact shall become valid immediately upon signature
and shall remain in force ten years from the date on which
it becomes effective. In due time, before the expiration of
the said term, the High Contracting Parties shall, at the
request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal.
In recognition thereof,
Berlin, the 27th of September, 1940
Ribbentrop
Oiano
Kurusu
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The first sources for study, research and documentation
of Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan are those specific
documents and related materials concerned with the Nazi regime
in the period from 1933 to 1945.

The two series of Documents

On German Foreign Policy provide most of the research source
material for the thesis.

Nearly all of the correspondence

from Germany to Japan in the period from 1933 to 1941 has been
collected and organized in these volumes.

This collection of

documents was the most single important source in the study.
The Fuehrer Conferences on matters dealing with the German Navy
provides another view of Hitler's opinion on the diplomatic
relations between the two countries and his strategy in the
critical years of 1940 and 1941.
The international war crimes trials conducted in the
immediate post-war period allowed those men associated with the
events in the period 1933 to 1945 to explain their actions to
the world.

The documents used in evidence and the record of the

trial proceedings for Germany and Japan have been collected in
three major sources:

Trial of the Manor War Criminals, Nazi

Conspiracy and Aggression, and International Military Tribunal
for the Far East.

These records contained some of the most

important diplomatic notes and the testimony of the major
participants in the diplomatic intercourse between Germany
and Japan from 1933 to 1941.
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Those documentary sources available for Japan were
extremely limited but the Congressional Hearings on the event
and the subsequent publication of Pearl Harbor Attack v/as the
most valuable documentary source for the Japanese diplomatic
I
correspondence. Pearl Harbor Attack proved especially valuable
for the crucial year of 1941. •

*

The documents and related materials collected by the
United States Department of State serve as useful reference tools
for United States correspondence and its position dipomatically
on the relations between Germany and Japan,

These sources

were: Documents on American Foreign Relations, Foreign
Relations of the United States 1938-1941, and Foreign Relations
of the United States-Japan 1931-1941.

Nazi-Soviet Relations

focuses on the relations between Russia and Germany and this
influence in Germany's diplomacy with Japan.

The Report of the

Seventh World Congress of the Communist International and
Documents on International Affairs were cited to corroborate
various speeches made by key figures in the period,
A number of biographies, autobiographies, diaries and
memoirs have been written by or about the most important men
in the period from 1933 to 1945.

Many of these works were

useful in the thesis but some lacked a degree of objectivity.
These apologetic volumes, mostly German, must be read with an
eye to other sources, the documents being the final arbitrator.
Memoirs, by Ernest Weizsaecker, the former State
Secretary under Ribbentrop, is a cautious presentation of
Weizsaecker's role in the Nazi government.

He has several
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excellent portraits of Hitler but he minimizes his statements
while in office under the guise of generalizations and shifting
circumstances.

Herbert von Dirksen's, Moscow Tokyo London, is

a more critical appraisal of Germany's foreign policy in the
years from 1933 to 1941 and Germany's position in the SinoJapanese war, Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, is another
useful source for firsthand descriptions of important diplomatic
events in the period through the eyes of Hitler's chief
Interpreter.

Geyr von Schv^eppenburg was Germany's military

representative to Great Britain in the late 1930's and served
under Ribbentrop when he v/as ambassador to that country. His
book, The Critical Years, is a good account of the period and
Germany's attitude toward Great Britain,
Alan Bullock's Hitler-A Study in Tyranny is the premier
*
work for any research on Hitler and the Nazi regime from 1933
to 1945,

It is a book that should be read first to understand

the man behind Germany's foreign policy in the period.

This

Man Ribbentrop by Paul Schwarz is useful for early background
material on Ribbentrop but is of little value for anything about
the man after 1933.

Haider's Private War Journals contains

only a few references to Germany's policy toward Japan,
Another view of Nazi Germany in the years from 1933 to
1941 is provided by two diaries:

Ambassador Dodd's Diary 1933

to 1938 and William Shirer's Berlin Diary.

Ambassador Dodd was

the United States ambassador to Germany and provided some
interesting but not always accurate assessments of Hitler's
foreign policy. Shirer is more perceptive and grasps the portent
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of various diplomatic events. The Ciano Diaries and Ciano's
Diplomatic Papers are the materials left by the Italian
Foreign Minister and successfully cover Italy's association
with Japan through the influence of Germany in the tv/o agreements
"to which all three powers were a party.
There have been a number of recent publications on the
important figures of Japan in this period under research.
Mosley's study of Hirohito, the Japanese emperor, is an excellent
presentation of the man,and is extremely valuable.

To.jo-The

Last Banzai by Courtney Brown is a biographical study of Japan's
wartime leader and his conduct of Japan's government. Shigenori
Togo, the Japanese Foreign Minister under Tojo, in his book.
The Cause of Japan, presents an excellent case for Japan's
position in the Par East and the pressures that led the country
to attack the United States.
Two views of Japan by foreign ambassadors are: Joseph
Grew, Ten Years in Japan, and Sir Robert Craigie, Behind the
Japanese Mask.

Grew's work is more important because of the

significence of the United States possession of the Japanese
diplomatic code in the late months before the outbreak of
war in 1941.
The large number of general works and momographs
available to supplement the documentary evidence and to aid in
the research helped to place the events in the proper perspective
for the years of decision. J.W. Gantenbein's Documentary
Background of World War II brings together the most important
documents concerning the outbreak of the war.

The Survey of
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International Affairs by Arnold Toynbee and others is a year-

by-year description of events throughout the world and was a
valuable'source for world reaction to German-Japanese relations.
Frank Chamber's This Age of Conflict is perhaps the best
single source for a comprehensive view of world events in the
period from 1933 to 1945. The Origins of the Second World War
by A.J.P. Taylor is a controversial book whose importance is
the controversy that Taylor raises in his thesis on the real
responsibility for the causes of the war.
The Rome-Berlin Axis by Elizabeth Wiskemann is an
excellent study of the diplomatic and political relations
between Germany and Italy. It has some good information on
Italy's position in the tripartite alliance system. Langer
and Gleason's The Undeclared War 1940-1941 is probably the
finest single study of Germany's policy in this period and her
diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia and Japan,
This source should be read by anyone doing research in this
time span.

Another study on the same material but not quite

as good is Trefousse's, German and American Neutrality 1939-1941.
Beloff's The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1939-1941 presents
I

a good picture of the position of the Russian government in
the affairs of Germany and Japan.

This book made it possible

to understand the implications of Germany's foreign policy
on other states.
There are a number of fine monographs which provided
limited information because their main intent dealt with other
subjects.

Churchill's volume, Their Finest Hour, of his series
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on World War II contained a few significant reflections on
Germany's foreign policy with Japan, The Sword and Swastika
by Telford Taylor is one of the best voiumes on the v;ar, fully
researched and documented, and whose text has some interesting
comments by leading German generals on the world situation
with Japan, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler 1933-1939 is an
exceptional collection of Hitler's major speeches from which
I quoted extensively for my text.
Two books; Ikle's German-Japanese Relations 1936-1940
and Schroeder's The Axis Alliance and Japanese—American
Relations cover the same material in a rather general inclusive
manner. Ikle uses Japanese documents extensively but his
work is rather shallow. Germany and Japan by Presseisen is
an excellent presentation of the diplomacy between the two
totalitarian states.

The three volumes by or associated

with Hitler; Mein Kampf. My New Order and Hitler's Secret
Conversations provide background material for the research
and help to understand the character of the leader of Germany,
The World of General Haushofer by Dorpolen explains the basis
for Geopolitics in Nazi Germany and its influence in German
diplomacy during the period.
The Dissentient Judgement by Radhabinod Pal on the
verdicts of the International Tribunal for the Far East is a
fine presentation of legalistic rebuttal to the war crimes
trials. Pal uses the record of the proceedings as evidence
for his case against the sentences of guilt with the legal
and moral reasons for his dissent. It is a critical scholarly
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study. The Trial of the Germans by Eugene Davidson is a
summary of the cases against the defendants at Nuremberg and
evidence against these persons.

All of the major conspirators

are covered but Davidson takes little issue with the verdicts
and supports the final judgements.
The large number of secondary sources available on
Japan in the period under study represents some important
background material for the thesis. David James' The Rise and
Fall of the Japanese Empire is a fine source for an analysis
and chronicle of the events in Japan from 1951 to 1945» as is
Japan's Few Order in East Asia by P.O. Jones.

Quigley's

The Par Eastern War is a detailed study of the Japanese war
with China and the events to Pearl Harbor,

Herbert Peis

covers political and diplomatic policies of the Japanese
government to the beginning of the war with the United States
in his excellent book, The Road to Pearl Harbor.

Maxon's

Control of Japanese Foreign Policy is a detailed analysis of
internal Japanese politics and its influence on foreign
diplomacy.

Japan's Decision to Surrender by Robert Butow

deals vfith material more pertinent to the period 1944-1945
but is also a reflection on past events.
The two books, one by Masuo Kato, The Lost War, and the
and the other by Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri, are
firsthand accounts by Japanese on the country's reactions to
the political and diplomatic policies of the Japanese government,
Ike's Japan's Decision for War is a record of the policy
conferences of the Japanese government in 1941 and the steps
toward Pearl Harbor.
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A great deal has been written about the Third Reich
since the end of the war but relatively few sources are
available on Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan. Two
books dealing with German diplomacy are Craig and Gilbert's
The Diplomats and Seabury's The Wilhelmstrasse.

The Diplomats

is an expanded study of German diplomacy after the first
World War and the technical aspects of the profession.
The Wilhelmstrasse is a more closely concerned study of
diplomacy in Nazi Germany and the key figures of the German
Foreign Office in the period.
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich by William Shirer
is the most comprehensive examination of the Third Reich
and has a few comments on Hitler's policy with Japan.
F.H. Kinsley's Hitler's Strategy is an excellent summation of
Hitler's strategic considerations for his subsequent actions
in world diplomacy.

The German Strategy of World Conquest

by Whittlesey is an exaggerated product of the war and is
of little value.

